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Abstract 
Recent government pronouncements in the UK and above all the recent Conservative 
Party (2008) policy document on welfare reform suggest that US welfare reform is 
increasingly being taken as a model for the UK. What lessons should the UK draw 
from US experience? The long established means tested programme for needy 
families known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced in 
1996 with a welfare to work programme known as Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). The historical background and features of the new program are 
elaborated and the way it has been implemented in varied ways in different states is 
documented. The findings of a number of outcome studies assessing the programme’s 
impact and effectiveness are reviewed. Three commentaries on the paper consider 
how far American experience should be a guide to welfare policy in Britain.  
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Introduction 
Today social policy scholars are paying more attention to the role of policy diffusion 
in the evolution of social welfare. Several studies have shown how policy innovations 
in some countries have influenced developments in others. Although much of this 
research has focused on the transfer of Western social policies to the developing 
countries of the Global South, attention has also been drawn to the exchange of 
welfare ideas between Western nations such as Britain and the United States. For 
obvious reasons, British and American welfare innovations have been shared for many 
years. Over three centuries ago, English settlers in the new American colonies 
replicated the Elizabethan Poor Law to deal with the growing problem of destitution 
and, in the 19th century, the novel methods of the Charity Organization Society and 
the Settlement Houses in England were enthusiastically emulated in major American 
cities. These innovations laid the foundations for the emergence of the social work 
profession which subsequently played a major role in the development of the 
country’s welfare system.  
 
During the 20th century, the process was largely reversed and welfare developments 
in the United States were more frequently emulated in Britain. For example, the urban 
community-based antipoverty programmes introduced by the Johnson administration 
in the 1960s inspired similar innovations in the United Kingdom. Similarly, 
psychotherapeutic social work in Britain has been largely shaped by American ideas. 
The impact of American policy innovations on British social policy during the 1990s 
has been recognized by several British scholars such as Julian Le Grand and his 
colleagues (2007, p.48) who observed that while British social policy had absorbed 
European and other international influences over the last twenty years, “… the 
principle role model has been the US.” 
 
Howard Glennerster (2002) has summarized these developments by showing that 
President Clinton’s make work pay policies influenced the Blair government which 
introduced a minimum-wage for the first time in 1999, as well as earned income and 
child care credits. Aspects of American welfare reform were also adopted in the New 
Deal programme which was introduced in 1999. As in the United States, this 
programme emphasized job placement although training and education were given 
more prominence. In addition, efforts by the previous Conservative government to 
strengthen the child support system were augmented by the Labour government. 
Glennerster points out that although these innovations did not result in the direct 
replication of American social policies, they significantly affected New Labour’s 
approach. 
 
There is considerable international interest in the policy changes introduced in United 
States in the 1990s, and particularly in the enactment of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that significantly altered the way 
the federal and state governments had for approximately sixty years paid means 
tested, cash benefits to low income, mostly single-parent families. These changes are 
loosely referred to in the United States as ‘welfare reform’, but it should be noted that 
term is used imprecisely.1  
 
Many social policy scholars believe that American welfare reform has influenced 
international social policy thinking where welfare to work policies and programmes 
are now given greater emphasis. Indeed, much has now been written about welfare to 
work in other nations, many of which are said to have been affected by developments 
in the United States (Considine, 2001; Evans, 2001: Handler, 2004; Lodemel and 
Trickey, 2001; Peck, 2001). American welfare reform has even attracted the attention 
of the international media. During the 1990s, The Economist magazine ran numerous 
stories on proposals to overhaul the American welfare system and in 2003, it reported 
in a major article entitled ‘America’s great achievement’, that the reform had been 
highly successful. 
 
A good deal of research on the outcomes of welfare reform in United States has now 
been undertaken and numerous assessments of its impact have been published. 
However, the picture that emerges is extremely complex. This paper will show that 
simplistic claims about the successes or failures of welfare reform, such as the one 
reported in The Economist in 2003, do not adequately capture these complexities or 
balance competing interpretations of its achievements. In addition, welfare reform 
involves wider issues that transcend the findings of empirical outcomes research. 
Since outcome studies are appropriately concerned with measuring the impact of 
welfare reform and assessing its effects, they cannot capture its wider political and 
cultural ramifications. A proper assessment of the overall impact of welfare reform 
must take account of these political and cultural effects. 
 
The following account examines the outcomes of welfare reform in the United States 
but specifically links research findings to interpretations that stress the wider 
dimensions of welfare reform. Hopefully, this more nuanced interpretation will be of 
interest to social policy scholars in Britain. Although it is not intended to draw 
specific lesson for British social policy, is inevitable that some aspects of the 
American experience will be of relevance and some brief comments on this issue may 
be appropriate. Of course, the commentaries by British colleagues that follow will 
offer a more accurate and up to date elaboration. But first, the historical and 
descriptive background to welfare reform and the welfare system of the United States 
will be briefly discussed.  
                                              
1  In addition, some scholars decisively reject its ameliorative implications arguing that welfare 
reform has not improved the circumstances of former welfare clients (Goldberg and Collins, 
2001). Although many scholars prefer the term ‘welfare to work’ which they believe more 
accurately captures the new programme’s intention, the term ‘welfare reform’ will be used 
here largely because its meaning is generally understood. 
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The Campaign for Welfare Reform  
In August 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which abolished a major cash transfer 
programme known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). This 
programme had been introduced by the Roosevelt administration as a part of the New 
Deal and it formed a major component of the Social Security Act of 1935. The 1996 
legislation replaced AFDC with a new welfare to work programme known as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Unlike AFDC which paid cash 
benefits as a rights-based entitlement, TANF subjected the payment of benefits to the 
availability of funds. It also imposed a variety of new conditions on recipients of 
which the work participation requirement is arguably the most important. The primary 
purpose of the legislation was to end what was often described as the ‘culture of 
dependency’ created by the welfare system. Welfare dependency was characterized by 
a reliance on cash benefits and a reluctance to work. By requiring welfare recipients to 
engage in regular employment, the legislation’s sponsors hoped to promote self-
sufficiency, raise the incomes of poor families, and facilitate social mobility. The new 
programme would also, it was claimed, address the problems of family 
disorganization, illegitimacy, crime and drug abuse, and other social ills associated 
with poverty and the underclass and that plagued inner-city areas in United States for 
many years. 
 
AFDC was widely regarded as central to the American welfare system. Indeed, its 
importance is revealed in the way it was synonymously referred to as ‘welfare’. Its 
abolition and replacement with the new TANF programme was therefore a significant 
development in American social policy. Although a number of leading Democratic 
politicians, academics, welfare activists and social workers deplored the termination 
of the programme, its opponents hailed its abolition as a ‘revolution’ in social policy 
which would end welfare dependency and reassert American values of responsibility 
and self-sufficiency. The incorporation of these values in the 1996 legislation was 
hailed as an important step in rebuilding what former House Speaker Newt Gingrich 
(1995) called the ‘Opportunity Society’.  
 
Welfare reform terminologies 
When politicians, journalists and even academics spoke about the AFDC programme, 
they referred to it as ‘welfare’ rather than AFDC. However, the use of an all-
encompassing term such as ‘welfare’ to connote a very specific social programme 
departs significantly from standard international usage and requires clarification. In 
most other countries, social policy scholars use the term to refer to a nexus of social 
programmes, cash transfers, services and mandates. Although the term is sometimes 
also used in United States to describe other means tested programmes such as the food 
voucher programme known as Food Stamps or the housing voucher programme, it 
was largely confined to connoting the AFDC programme. On the other hand, the large 
and expensive social insurance retirement scheme operated by the federal government, 
which is known as Social Security, is hardly if ever described as welfare. This is also 
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true of other income transfer programmes such as unemployment insurance and 
workers’ compensation. Although unemployment insurance is often associated with 
the term ‘welfare’ in Western countries, this is not the case in the United States. 
Unemployment insurance is intended for laid-off workers who have been in regular 
employment and who have earned steady wages or salaries for extended periods of 
time. AFDC or ‘welfare’ was designed for low-wage workers with children who have 
never been in regular employment or who only work intermittently. While most 
recipients of unemployment benefits are men, the overwhelming majority of AFDC 
recipients were women.  
 
This usage of the term ‘welfare’ is not only of semantic but of policy significance 
because in United States, the term ‘welfare reform’ refers to the termination of only 
one out of many governmental social programmes. This puts welfare reform into 
perspective because there are literally hundreds of governmental programmes in 
United States that transfer public resources to people or groups of people who are 
regarded as having special social needs and deserving of assistance. Key among these 
programmes are Social Security, unemployment insurance, school meals, workers’ 
compensation, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)2, the Food Stamp programme, 
housing assistance, maternal and child welfare programmes, the foster care system 
and Medicare and Medicaid. Also included are tax advantaged retirement accounts, 
mortgage interest tax relief, health insurance income deductions and other policies that 
primarily benefit middle and higher income earners. In the United States, taxpayers 
also heavily subsidize the voluntary or non-profit sector and, of course, sizable 
subsidies and tax benefits known colloquially as ‘corporate welfare’ accrue to 
agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises. The American ‘welfare state’ is 
thus a vast and complex entity in which services, cash transfers, incentives and 
mandates are used to promote social goals by the federal and state governments, as 
well as the counties and cities. Today, ten years after welfare reform, these 
programmes continue to operate without significant modification. Indeed, since then, 
several social programmes have been expanded and new ones have even been added.3 
 
It may seem perplexing to international observers that AFDC’s opponents should have 
greeted its abolition with such enthusiasm. Equally perplexing is the fact that they are 
apparently unconcerned that the rest of the welfare system remains intact and 
continues to consume sizable public resources.4 This point will be considered again 
                                              
2  The Earned Income Tax Credit is federal a wage subsidization programme operated through 
the tax system. It will be described in more detail later. 
3  It is also of policy significance that the AFDC programme was by no means the largest or 
most expensive of these programmes. On the eve of welfare reform in 1995, AFDC paid 
benefits to fewer people than Social Security, schools meals, workers’ compensation, the 
EITC and the food voucher system. It consumed about one tenth of total allocations to the 
country’s means tested programmes and a fraction of the cost of the Social Security 
retirement programme. 
4  A major exception is Charles Murray (2006) who continues to advocate for the abolition all 
are income transfer in social services programs. 
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when different interpretations of the reasons for the abolition of the AFDC programme 
and the wider ideological dimensions of the reform are considered.  
 
Welfare’s historical origins and the expansion of AFDC 
Although the AFDC programme was introduced in 1935, it was historically rooted in 
the Poor Law which was introduced into the English speaking North American 
colonies in the 17th century. Generally, the colonial Poor Law statutes were designed 
to deal with destitute settlers who were unable to make a living and many were 
repatriated. As in England, they made a clear distinction between the deserving and 
undeserving poor and moral criteria were explicitly used to determine eligibility. 
Accordingly, only those of respectable lineage and reputable character were assisted. 
Indigent elderly people or the morally worthy widow with children who had fallen on 
hard times were viewed as particularly deserving of public support. These moral 
notions survived as key eligibility requirements for many years and continued to 
permeate public perceptions about who should and should not receive welfare 
benefits.  
 
The large numbers of families who lost their male breadwinners during the Civil War 
engendered a great deal of public sympathy and it was at this time that the first federal 
programme was established to assist disabled veterans and the families of those who 
were killed in action. Many of the states instituted their own programmes to 
supplement the federal government’s veterans’ provisions and many focused 
particularly on the widows and children of slain soldiers.  
 
These developments were accompanied at the end of the 19th century by a growing 
concern about the rising numbers of children kept in orphanages. Residential facilities 
were widely used in the 19th century but conditions in the asylums, workhouses and 
orphanages were widely criticized. Although some of the leaders of the charities 
advocated that even more orphanages be constructed, others argued that poor widows 
should be financially assisted so that they could raise their children at home. This 
view gathered public support and, in the early decades of the 20th century, the 
movement for what became known as widows’ or mothers’ pensions intensified.  
 
The first mother’s pension was established by the state government of Missouri in 
1911 closely followed in the same year by Illinois. This development was soon 
emulated by other states and by 1920 mother’s pensions had been introduced in forty 
states. In 1935, when the federal government’s Social Security Act was adopted, the 
number had risen to 48 and only Georgia and South Carolina had failed to introduce 
these programmes (Trattner, 1999). However, the economic pressures of the Great 
Depression limited the ability of the states to adequately fund the mothers’ pensions 
and requests for federal support increased. It was primarily for this reason that 
mothers’ pensions were partially nationalized when the Social Security Act was 
passed in 1935. 
 
The Social Security Act was an omnibus amalgamation of different social 
programmes. In view of the high incidence of unemployment at the time, the first 
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priority of its sponsors was to establish a national unemployment insurance 
programme which would be jointly administered with the state governments. 
Although President Roosevelt was initially lukewarm about proposals to introduce a 
retirement insurance programme, several members of Congress as well as populist 
campaigners such as Dr. Townsend of California had advocated for the payment of 
cash benefits to the elderly and not wishing to be outmanoeuvred, the President 
agreed. Unlike unemployment insurance, the new retirement programme would be 
funded from a new national payroll tax and entirely administered by the federal 
government. The Social Security Act also replaced the mothers’ pensions by creating 
a new joint federal and state programme initially known as Aid to Dependent Children 
(ADC). It was subsequently renamed AFDC. A funding formula was adopted by 
which the federal government assumed responsibility for most of the programme’s 
costs but left its day to day administration to the states and permitted them to 
determine benefit levels. The result was significant variations in benefit levels in 
different parts of the country with the Southern states generally paying the lowest 
amounts. 
 
AFDC paid benefits mostly to low-income families headed by lone mothers. Benefits 
could also be claimed lone fathers who stayed at home to care for their children or by 
relatives or others who assumed responsibility for them. In addition, two parent 
families in poverty were also entitled to benefits. However, the overwhelming 
majority of claimants were lone mothers and in keeping with the intention of the 
earlier mothers’ pensions programme, most were widows. However, in time more 
divorced women with children applied and during the 1970s, the proportion of women 
applicants with children who had never married increased rapidly. Relatively few two 
parent or lone father families were assisted.  
 
For many years, AFDC was a modest and obscure programme and initially, the 
number of recipients was low. It is estimated that about 150,000 families received 
AFDC benefits when the programme was established in the mid-1930s. Although 
modest increases were recorded during the 1950s and early 1960s, ‘the caseload’, as it 
is known, increased rapidly during the late 1960 and the 1970s, but flattened out 
during the 1980s. By this time, about 3.5 million families were in receipt of benefits. 
In the early 1990s, this figure again increased, rising to a peak of about 5.1 million 
families early in 1994. This figure translates into about 14.2 million individuals. By 
mid-1994, enrolment numbers began to decline and they continued to decline further 
until the early years of the 21st century when they again flattened out but at a 
significantly lower level of about 2.1 million families - accounting for approximately 
5.6 million individuals (Besharov and Germanis, 2003). Of course, by this time the 
AFDC programme had been replaced by the TANF programme so this figure refers to 
the numbers receiving TANF benefits. By 2005, the caseload had fallen slightly 
further to about 1.9 million families or about 5.1 million individuals. The latest data 
provided by the Federal government’s Department of Health and Human Services 
show that in February 2008 about 1.7 million families were enrolled in the TANF 
programme. 
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On the eve of welfare reform, the vast majority of families in receipt of AFDC were 
headed by lone mothers of whom about 50 per cent had never been married. Most had 
their first child at about the age of 20. Less than 300,000 families were headed by lone 
fathers and only a small fraction were two parent families. Almost a half of AFDC 
recipients had not completed high school. Almost 40 per cent were white, 37 per cent 
were African American and 18 per cent Latinos. Both African American and Latino 
clients were over-represented in the AFDC population. Indeed, three times as many 
African Americans were in receipt of AFDC as in the general population (Hombs, 
1996).    
 
Various explanations of the increase in the AFDC caseload during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s have been offered. While some believe that cash transfer programmes 
inevitably create a moral hazard and invite undeserving applications, others argue that 
the rise was largely due to the economic stagnation and unemployment of the 1970s. 
However, there is evidence to show that the increase in the number of welfare 
recipients was also the result of a conscious policy decision to use AFDC as an anti-
poverty measure. Although the immediate post-war years United States were 
accompanied by growing prosperity, commentators such as Michael Harrington 
(1962) drew attention to the persistence of poverty, particularly among the country’s 
white rural population and media reports of the appalling conditions in which these 
families lived garnered a great deal of public sympathy. It was in this context that 
President Kennedy declared his intention to address the problem. This sparked a rapid 
expansion of the AFDC programme.  
 
President Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society initiatives contributed directly 
to this expansion. The War on Poverty created several new social programmes 
intended to assist poor families. In addition to establishing community building and 
employment generating projects at the local level, a new child care programme for the 
young children of poor families known as Head Start was created. Other innovations 
were the Job Corps targeted at unemployed youth. A free legal advice service for poor 
families was also introduced. Believing that increases in cash transfer payments to 
poor families would reduce the incidence of poverty, efforts to enrol more poor 
families in the AFDC programme intensified during the late 1960. The popularization 
of this idea was accompanied by an increasingly effective grassroots campaign to 
extend cash benefits to poor people as of right. The National Welfare Rights 
Organization lobbied tirelessly to expand the number of welfare beneficiaries and 
frequently sought redress through the courts to ensure that local bureaucrats and 
policy makers did not obstruct this goal (Nadasen, 2005). Social policy scholars such 
as Wilbur Cohen and Mitchell Ginsberg who had been appointed to senior social 
service administrative positions also endorsed the view that the payment of cash 
benefits was an effective instrument for reducing poverty. Ginberg who was appointed 
by Mayor John Lindsay to head New York’s vast welfare bureaucracy in the late 
1960s gained notoriety for actively encouraging the payment of benefits. He was also 
held responsible for the soaring numbers of people receiving benefits at a time that the 
city of New York faced a major fiscal crisis (Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998). 
 7
Extensive media coverage of events in New York and the prodigious increase in the 
number of welfare recipients in other parts of the country soon drew attention to the 
increasing proportion of African-Americans on the welfare rolls. At this time, the civil 
rights struggle was at the forefront of public attention not only because of recent anti-
segregation campaigns in the Southern states, but because of the urban ‘race riots’ in 
which incidents of looting and violence were vividly reported. Television images of 
these events did little to promote positive race relations attitudes among white, 
middle-class suburbanites. As media reports increasingly associated the payment of 
welfare benefits with race, it became clear that welfare was an issue of growing 
electoral significance.  
 
Both Presidents Nixon and Carter incorporated welfare reform into their electoral 
campaigns. Nixon actually proposed far-reaching reforms that, if implemented, would 
have replaced the AFDC program with a guaranteed minimum income. However, 
despite its progressive elements, the Nixon plan failed to secure Congressional 
passage, although it did pave the way for the subsequent introduction of the EITC.5 
Although President Carter failed to introduce significant changes to AFDC, his 
insistence that the programme was in need of reform reinforced its negative image.  
 
Turning point: The attack on welfare 
President Reagan probably made the most effective electoral use of welfare’s negative 
imagery. He drew extensively on the writings of a new generation of social policy 
scholars on the political right such as George Gilder (1981), Charles Murray (1984) 
and Lawrence Mead (1986) all of whom attacked the generally accepted belief that 
economic and social problems could be solved through government intervention. 
Reagan frequently echoed Murray’s claim that government had actually made things 
worse and that the nation had ‘lost ground’ as a result of its social programmes. He 
ridiculed the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty by announcing that contrary to 
its promise, poverty had won. But it was his imagery of the ‘welfare queen’ that had a 
particularly effective impact. Based on an actual case of an African American woman 
in Chicago who had extensively abused the AFDC system, he communicated the 
notion that the vast majority of welfare recipients were indolent cheaters who had 
unashamedly exploited the altruistic generosity of the nation’s taxpayers. Although 
the president avoided any reference to race, most white Americans understood the 
insinuation and welfare was now irrevocably racialised and gendered (Reese, 2005; 
Hancock, 2004).  
 
The Reagan administration also took steps to address the welfare ‘problem’ and, with 
the passage of the 1982 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (or OBRA) in 1981, 
stricter eligibility requirements were imposed. This resulted in the reduction of 
termination of AFDC benefits for approximately 700,000 families. Compliance 
monitoring was also tightened (Stoesz, 2000). A far-reaching initiative known as the 
New Federalism by which federal social programmes would be devolved to the states 
                                              
5  The Nixon Plan has not received the attention it deserves from social policy scholars in the 
United States. A recent book by Brian Steensland (2008) may however rectify this omission. 
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was also launched. Several federal community development programmes established 
during the War on Poverty were transferred to the state governments and federal 
funding for these programmes were transformed into block grants which the states 
could use with greater discretion than before. As will be shown, the President’s 
devolution initiative has since become a key element of welfare reform.  
 
Many Republicans endorsed the President’s anti-welfare posture and it was soon clear 
to the Democrats that they no longer had public support for a programme they had 
championed and previously viewed as the embodiment of shared altruistic values and 
a desire on the part most Americans to help the unfortunate. President Reagan and the 
political right had pulled the moral rug from under their feet and aware of the electoral 
damage that the President’s attacks on welfare would cause, they scrambled to regain 
the initiative. Although they rejected the old Poor Law idea of ‘setting the poor to 
work’, they recognized that work participation was a desirable goal which could be 
achieved through strengthening opportunities for AFDC recipients to acquire the 
educational credentials and skills that would prepare them for active labour market 
participation.  
 
Of course, this was not a new idea. Job-training for welfare mothers and others had 
been introduced in the late 1960s but generally take-up was low.6 With the support of 
a sizable number of moderate Republicans, new legislation known as the Family 
Support Act was introduced in 1988. The statute created a new programme known as 
the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Programs (JOBS) which required the 
states to assign a quota of welfare recipients to education and training programmes. 
These quotas, known as ‘participation rates’ were intended to set firm goals for 
promoting the acquisition of job skills and future employment. Since participation was 
mandatory, AFDC recipients who failed to attend classes or training sessions could be 
sanctioned primarily through benefit reductions. In addition to imposing penalties for 
noncompliance, the legislation also created incentives. For example, funds were not 
only allocated to meet educational and related expenses but to provide transportation, 
childcare and other support services to help clients acquire the skills that would help 
them to secure regular employment.  
 
It was in the context of these changes that the term ‘welfare reform’ was popularized. 
The idea that welfare recipients should be encouraged to work, and that resources 
should be made available to help them achieve this goal through education and skills 
training seemed to the sponsors of the legislation to offer a viable alternative to what 
many regarded as a crude and intemperate attack on a programme that had helped 
millions of needy families. Although supporters of AFDC believed that the 
programme had been successfully reformed, critics were not persuaded and in the 
early 1990s, the new JOBS programme itself was heavily criticized for failing to 
achieve its goals. Soon, even more radical proposals for welfare reform were offered. 
 
                                              
6  For a review of earlier job training and welfare to work programmes see Livermore (2000). 
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One problem was that earlier education and training programmes for welfare 
recipients were not well regarded. They were poorly funded and haphazardly 
implemented and as noted earlier, take up was low. Although proponents of the JOBS 
programme argued that its mandatory participation requirement would prepare welfare 
recipients for work, critics rebuffed this claim alleging that they were simply being 
referred to local colleges and other educational institutions to acquire paper 
credentials that failed to inculcate the technical skills that the country’s 
technologically advanced and competitive economy required. Critics also claimed that 
the use of attendance criteria to meet state participation quotas hardly constituted an 
adequate preparation for regular employment.  
 
In addition, evidence was produced to show that the numbers of welfare recipients had 
increased steadily since the enactment of the Family Support Act. The fact that the 
country was in recession and that there were limited employment opportunities for 
welfare recipients was dismissed and attention continued to be focused on their 
alleged abuse of the system. At this time, a number of in-depth studies of the welfare 
caseload were undertaken and although they produced results that countered 
prevailing anti-welfare attitudes, the momentum for radical reform continued apace. 
Research by Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood (1994) revealed that most welfare 
recipients were not in fact in long-term receipt of benefits but that their ‘spells’ on 
welfare were of relatively short duration. In addition, many cycled in and out of the 
welfare system. Many found employment, usually in low paying service occupations, 
but often changing family circumstances involving child care or illness among 
children resulted in the loss of employment and a return to the welfare office.  
 
In addition, several researchers (Edin and Lein, 1997; Harris, 1993; Rank, 1994) 
found that many recipients were in fact engaged in clandestine employment. Since 
benefit levels were generally insufficient to meet the needs of these families, many 
supplemented their benefits through intermittent, low paid work in the underground 
economy and were not, as critics had claimed, completely dependent on welfare. 
Many viewed their welfare payment as one of several sources of household income 
which was augmented by often irregular child support payments, in-kind support from 
friends and relatives, gifts and loans and of course intermittent employment. The 
image presented by this research was one of poor women with children actually 
working very hard and, as Ruth Sidel (2006) suggested, struggling heroically to 
provide for their children and to make ends meet. Although this research contradicted 
the negative, workshy image presented by welfare critics, it failed to attract much 
media attention or to make an impact on policy makers who were increasingly 
persuaded that coercive measures were needed to compel AFDC recipients to work. 
A major proponent of this idea was Laurence Mead who first attracted the attention of 
social policy scholars in the 1980s for his attack on the idea that income benefits 
should be provided to those in need as a social right. Mead (1986) argued persuasively 
that social rights are not granted unconditionally but are reciprocally dependent on the 
discharge of social obligations. Accordingly, welfare benefits should only be paid if 
claimants had first made a good faith effort to meet their social obligations by seeking 
employment and conforming to the norms and expectations of the community. The 
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entitlement culture, he argued, had undermined these notions and caricatured the idea 
of rights. The welfare system should be radically overhauled and work effort should 
be a precondition for the payment of benefits.7  
 
Mead fervently advocated the ‘work first’ notion in social welfare. Although this was 
not a new idea, it was subsequently adopted in the 1996 legislation and pervades the 
TANF programme. Work first requires the immediate placement of welfare recipients 
in employment irrespective of their educational level or skills. Work first proponents 
believe that by compelling welfare recipients to engage in steady employment, they 
will acquire desirable habits and a work ethic. Educational qualifications and job skills 
can be acquired after they are placed into regular jobs. Work first proponents also 
propose that sanctions such as benefit reductions be used to require welfare recipients 
to work. Mead was not, as is often claimed, in favour of expelling welfare recipients 
from the AFDC programme. Rather, he argued that it should use a ‘paternalistic’ 
approach to bring about desirable behavioural changes and encourage recipients 
acquire the skills they need to become self-sufficient and productive citizens (Mead, 
1997).  
 
These ideas were soon adopted by the critics of the JOBS programme who promoted 
work first as an alternative to its human capital investment approach. Work first 
advocates also claimed to be vindicated by studies of the outcomes of the JOBS 
programme which questioned its effectiveness. One study in particular attracted a 
great deal of attention. Undertaken by the Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (Riccio, Freidlander and Freedman, 1994), it compared outcomes 
between different California counties and particularly between Riverside County 
which had adopted work first and Alameda County where the human capital approach 
was used. The study found that welfare clients in Riverside found employment more 
quickly than in Alameda, that their post-welfare incomes were higher, and that the 
costs of the programme in Riverside had been significantly reduced. A subsequent 
study in two other states confirmed this finding (Freedman and Freidlander, 1995). 
Although the authors cautioned that their research was based on a relatively short time 
period and that it would take time for clients in education and training programmes to 
realize the benefits of the human capital approach, these findings fuelled antipathy 
towards the human capital investment assumptions of the JOBS programme.  
 
These findings also comported well with the political campaign being waged against 
welfare. Aware of the electoral benefits of reforming welfare, Republican leaders 
redoubled their efforts to replace the Family Support Act and the JOBS programme 
with a more stringent approach based on the work first idea. They were supported by 
                                              
7  In a subsequent book, which was published at the height of the recession in the early 1990s, 
Mead (1992) castigated the culture of worklessness which he claimed permeated American 
society. The fundamental problem facing the United States, he argued, was a reluctance on 
the part many Americans to engage in regular employment. It was this problem that was 
responsible for America’s economic decline and for the country’s current economic 
difficulties.  
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several state governors who also recognized that there was political capital to be 
gained from tackling the widely perceived problem of welfare abuse. One of the first 
was Governor John Engler of Michigan who attracted national attention by summarily 
abolishing the state’s General Assistance programme. General Assistance had 
survived as a remnant of the old Poor Law, and although the programme was small 
and provided meagre benefits mostly to homeless people, its abolition was supported 
by many voters. Seventeen other states followed Michigan’s example. 
 
Engler’s initiative was augmented by a variety of proposals from state governments 
that sought to introduce conditionalities on the payment of welfare benefits. However, 
the states had no authority to introduce these initiatives without permission from the 
federal government and an increasing the number sought waivers from the federal 
rules to experiment with new approaches. It was during the Reagan presidency in the 
1980s that a number of states first requested waivers and during the first Bush 
presidency, the number of waiver requests increased and most were granted. The 
waivers permitted the states to test new initiatives that imposed more stringent 
conditions on welfare recipients. In addition to requiring them to seek and accept 
work, several imposed a ‘workfare’ requirement by which welfare recipients were 
assigned to public service employment in return for benefits. Several also introduced a 
‘learnfare’ requirement that the children of AFDC recipients attend school regularly, 
or that they be immunized and have regular health checks. Several state governments 
adopted a ‘family cap’ in terms of which benefits levels were frozen if a welfare 
mother had additional children. The number of waivers increased further during the 
early years of the Clinton administration and reinforced the trend toward the 
devolution of the AFDC programme. Many of the waivers adopted by the states 
subsequently became permanent features of their TANF programmes.  
 
Ending Welfare as We Know It 
Bill Clinton is widely regarded as a consummate political operator who was 
particularly adept at using electioneering sound bites which were frequently repeated 
by the media and are still remembered today. ‘It’s the economy stupid’ drew attention 
to the recession of the early 1990s and rising unemployment. ‘Make work pay’ 
promised to address the stagnating incomes that many lower middle class Americans 
had experienced and ‘ending welfare as we know it’ announced his intention to take 
control of the welfare issue and resolve it. Soon after his election, he moved swiftly to 
implement these campaign promises. The Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded 
and a major economic stimulus package was sent to Congress. It provided new 
incentives to businesses, increased funding for education and at the same time raised 
taxes on higher income earners. It also addressed the budget deficit which had reached 
unprecedented proportions. The President also appointed a working group to 
formulate proposals for welfare reform. 
 
Comprised of leading social policy scholars David Ellwood, Mary Jo Bane and Peter 
Edelman, as well as Clinton insider Bruce Reed and experienced Congressional 
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staffers such as Wendell Primus, the Working Group on Welfare Reform, Family 
Support and Independence as it was called, set about drafting proposals to address the 
welfare issue. Although they worked within the existing policy framework of the 
Family Support Act, a number of innovations were also proposed. Chief of these was 
Ellwood’s recommendation that welfare benefits be time limited and that greater 
efforts be made to require work participation. The working group also proposed that 
child-support enforcement be strengthened and that the provisions of the EITC be 
further liberalized. In addition, they stressed the need for an eclectic and experimental 
approach which would permit the states to innovate and test different approaches that 
would increase work participation. Sizable resources to fund these initiatives were 
contemplated.  
 
While the working group’s proposals were being drafted, the Republican minority in 
Congress sought to outmanoeuvre the President by formulating their own proposals. 
In 1993, several months before the publication of the working group’s report, the 
Republicans introduced a bill proposing that the AFDC programme be replaced with a 
new welfare to work programme which would impose time limits and stringent work 
participation requirements and permit the use of sanctions for noncompliance. The bill 
also proposed that benefits to immigrants be terminated and that the new welfare to 
work programme (as well as a number of other social service programmes including 
the federal Food Stamp programme and the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) 
programme) be devolved to the states.  
 
The Working group’s own proposals were introduced in June, 1994 and formed the 
basis for the Democrat’s Work and Personal Responsibility Act. Their proposals 
proved to be very controversial. Welfare rights and lobbying organizations strongly 
opposed time limits and they were joined by many progressive Democrats who 
claimed that children would suffer if these requirements we imposed. Senator Patrick 
Daniel Moyninhan was a particularly vociferous critic of time limits. He also opposed 
the Republican proposals which, he claimed would result in millions of impoverished 
homeless children ‘sleeping on the grates.’ On the other hand, many Republicans 
strongly opposed what they regarded as the working group’s ‘soft’ provisions and 
failure to adopt a rigorous work first approach that would compel welfare clients to 
work. Many critics also pointed out that budgetary restrictions precluded the 
allocation of new funds for innovative experiments. Although the working group’s bill 
and the alternative Republican bill were the first attempts to radically modify the 
AFDC system, welfare had become a topical issue and several competing Republican 
bills as well as bills by Democratic members of Congress were introduced.8  
 
In the run up to the 1994 Congressional elections, the increasingly radical and 
confrontational Republican leadership unveiled its ‘Contract with America’ which 
                                              
8  In fact, no less than 22 welfare bills were eventually considered during this period including 
one by the veteran Congressional social policy expert Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who 
sought to reassert in legislative form the original rights based intentions of the AFDC 
programme. Predictably, Moynihan’s bill failed, although by a comparatively narrow margin. 
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promised to reduce taxes, create an improved entrepreneurial business climate and 
restore the country’s traditional conservative values. Welfare reform was another key 
element of the contract. In addition to imposing mandatory work requirements and a 
two-year lifetime limit, the Republicans promised that AFDC benefits would no 
longer be paid to immigrants or to teenage mothers. Sizable reductions in budgetary 
allocations to a variety of social programmes including housing and Food Stamps 
would also be imposed. Following their election victory, these proposals were 
introduced into the House in the form of the Personal Responsibility Act.  
 
However, by this time, opposition to the Republican proposals had reached a new 
level of intensity. Although the Republican bill secured passage, it was strongly 
opposed by Democrats and in January 1996, it was vetoed by the President. Renewed 
efforts were now made to find a compromise between the Republican and Democratic 
positions and after a flurry of negotiation in which various amendments were 
accepted, a new bill easily passed both houses in July 1996. The bill’s Republican 
authors agreed to withdraw a number of their original proposals and the Democrats 
conceded to Republican demands by agreeing to the imposition of more stringent 
conditionalities. Although the final statute is often viewed as having translated into 
law the worst ideological antipathies to welfare, it was in fact a hard fought 
conciliation of quite different approaches and beliefs. Although President Clinton was 
urged to again veto the legislation, he was facing re-election and taunted by his 
opponent, Senator Bob Dole to live up to his promise of ending welfare, he acquiesced 
and the bill was duly signed in August of that year. The new Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act came into effect a year later. The President 
was widely criticized for failing to veto the legislation and in addition to enduring the 
censure of many activist welfare organizations and the bill’s Democratic opponents, 
three key members of the working group resigned in protest. They included Peter 
Edelman (1997) who vociferously attacked the President contending that signing the 
legislation was “the worst thing Bill Clinton had ever done.”  
 
The TANF Programme: Key provisions  
The new legislation contains a number of complex provisions. These can best be 
summarized by examining first, those concerned directly with the new TANF 
programme and second, those that supplement the programme through a variety of 
incentives and work supports. Obviously, the creation of the TANF programme and its 
work requirement is the single most important provision of the statute. However, the 
legislation’s other provisions were also viewed as vital for the programme’s success. 
They include the improvement of paternity determination and child support 
enforcement procedures, the allocation of additional funds for day care and the 
introduction of marriage promotion and abstinence educational programmes. Other 
significant innovations include the first-ever legislative authorization for the allocation 
of funds to religious or ‘faith based’ organizations and the requirement that the new 
TANF programme be properly evaluated.  
 
In addition to replacing the AFDC programme, the TANF programme reversed many 
of AFDC’s long established provisions. Arguably the most important of these was the 
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abrogation of the perquisite that American citizens have a right to public assistance 
when experiencing financial need. The legislation ended this ‘entitlement’ provision 
as it is known, and claimants who meet eligibility requirements are no longer 
guaranteed benefits. Although many social programmes in the United States and 
elsewhere are limited by the availability of funds, eligibility for AFDC had not been 
subject to budgetary limitations. The statute removed this provision and benefits are 
now only paid if sufficient funds are available to meet the programme’s obligations. 
The reversal of AFDC’s entitlement provisions also involved the imposition of new 
conditionalities on the receipt of benefits such as the work participation requirement.  
 
Another key provision is the devolution of the TANF programme to the states. In 
keeping with the trend begun by President Reagan, the Republicans not only 
transferred administrative responsibility for the TANF programme to the states but as 
was noted earlier, states were given considerable flexibility in interpreting the 
legislation and in using both federal and state funds to meet their own needs. The 
Republicans also intended to transfer other major social programmes such as Food 
Stamps and Medicaid to the states but in the end, only the TANF programme was 
devolved. Funding for the TANF programme was ‘block granted’ in that each state 
was given a fixed budgetary allocation based on the 1994 level of federal support for 
AFDC. This translated into a total annual federal allocation of about $16.5 billion 
which would remain constant until the legislation came up for reauthorization in 2001.  
The states were also required to maintain a defined level of financial commitment (or 
maintenance of effort as it is called) to the programme similar to the amount they 
previously allocated to AFDC in terms of its funding formula. The conditionalities 
previously attached to the use of state funds were also relaxed. Since state 
‘maintenance of effort’ funds were no longer directly matched with federal 
allocations, they were not subject to federal rules and accordingly, the state 
governments now have far greater control over the way they spend these funds. The 
‘requirements’ imposed on the states by the federal government, therefore, only relate 
to the use of TANF funds. Accordingly, some states now use their maintenance of 
effort funds to exceed the federal time limit, vary the participation requirement and 
impose sanctions as they think appropriate. Control over these funds has accentuated 
differences in the way the TANF programme has been implemented in the different 
states.9  
 
The conditionality requirements imposed on TANF recipients relate primarily to work 
participation and time limits. States are required to ensure that a specified proportion 
of welfare recipients engage in employment or work-related activities. Initially, 20 per 
cent of TANF recipients were required to participate in work or work-related activities 
for a minimum of 20 hours per week. This proportion would increase incrementally so 
that by 2001, 50 per cent of the caseload would participate in work activities for a 
                                              
9  Because of their constitutional rights, the federal government cannot dictate welfare policy to 
the state governments but it may impose requirements with regard to the way federal funds 
are spent. Therefore, the federal government is only able to require compliance with regard to 
the use of federal TANF funds. 
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minimum of 30 hours per week. Participation includes regular employment in the 
open labour market, subsidized employment, community service (known as workfare), 
on the job training and up to 12 months of vocational training. Teen mothers who 
attend school regularly and make satisfactory progress are treated as meeting the work 
participation requirement. 
 
The work participation requirement gives expression to the TANF programme’s work 
first philosophy. Although the legislation does not preclude the use of education and 
job training, no more than 30 percent of the caseload is permitted to participate in 
approved vocational programmes for a maximum of 12 months. However, the 
legislation also provided for exceptions to the work participation requirement. Welfare 
recipients with children under the age of one year are permitted at the discretion of the 
state government to be exempted and those with children under the age of six years 
who can demonstrate that that they are unable to obtain or afford child care may also 
be exempted. In addition, the legislation created an incentive by which the proportion 
of exceptions permitted may increase in direct proportion to the decline in the 
caseload below the 1995 level.  
 
The imposition of time limits was a major feature of the new legislation and clients 
may not receive TANF benefits for more than a total 60 months. However, states may 
at their discretion impose shorter time limits and many have done so. Although the 
time limit provision is regarded as particularly stringent, 20 percent of the caseload 
may be exempted primarily to accommodate particularly disadvantaged ‘hard to 
serve’ clients who face what are known as ‘barriers’ that preclude them from entering 
regular employment. Generally, this provision applies to clients with learning 
difficulties and psychological and other problems, as well as those with infants and 
very young children. 
 
The TANF programme also provides for the use of sanctions. In keeping with the 
legislation’s ‘paternalistic’ intentions, sanctions were not primarily intended to 
terminate benefits and thus to end participation in the programme but rather to shape 
behaviour and ensure that welfare recipients work and behave in socially desirable 
ways. Accordingly, it was intended that the imposition of sanctions would be 
accompanied by an aggressive intervention designed to remedy the offending 
behaviour. Generally, sanctions involve a reduction in benefit payments but the states 
may opt to terminate payments altogether. The legislation does require the complete 
termination of TANF benefits in cases of continued, wilful substance abuse and the 
refusal of a teen parent to live in the family home or under the supervision of an 
approved adult. 
 
In addition to its key conditionalities, the legislation specifically disallowed the 
payment of benefits to immigrants and non-citizens and also addresses what the bill’s 
Republican authors believed were serious loopholes and abuses of other social welfare 
programmes. Among these was the practice of claiming benefits from the federal 
government’s disability insurance programme on the ground that drug and alcohol 
addiction are disabilities. Another was the use of a federal programme known as 
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Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to obtain benefits on behalf of children who were 
deemed to be disabled because of psychological conditions such as attention deficit 
disorder. The number of people claiming benefits of this kind had increased steadily 
over the years and had incensed welfare critics. Although the issue was hotly 
contested during Congressional debates, Democrats acquiesced to Republican 
demands that these practices be specifically prohibited.  
 
Work supports, incentives and educational programmes 
Although the most stringent features of the TANF programme such as the abrogation 
of entitlement, conditionality and sanctions are often emphasized in the accounts of 
American welfare reform, the statute also introduced a number of provisions intended 
to support and facilitate employment. These were aggressively advocated by 
Democrats who believed that increased work participation would only be possible if 
work supports and resources for child care, transportation, health care and other 
services were made available.  
 
An important innovation was the creation of the Child Care and Development Fund 
which provides additional resources and increases the number of children from low 
income families who can be placed in day care facilities. This provision was 
specifically introduced to facilitate work participation. Five existing child care 
programmes were consolidated into a single block grant and additional federal 
funding was made available. States were also required to contribute to the fund and, 
through a complicated formula, the total amount available for child care reached 
approximately $4 billion per annum in 1997 which was a significant increase over 
previous allocations (Haskins, 2006). As well be shown later, surplus TANF funds 
have been allocated to further extend child care services in many states. 
 
Another innovation was the liberalization of income and asset restrictions. Under the 
AFDC programme, benefits were terminated if clients reported additional income 
from employment and other sources. As shown earlier, this practice encouraged 
clandestine employment in the underground economy. The statute now allowed states 
to ease these restrictions and it permitted a more gradual phase out of benefits as 
household income increased. Asset limits were also increased and special provision 
was made to permit the ownership of a motor car so that clients could drive to work. 
The legislation also permitted the states to establish matched savings accounts known 
as Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). 
 
A major initiative was the tightening up of paternity determination and child support 
collection procedures. It was generally agreed that child support obligations had been 
poorly enforced in the past. In many cases, the fathers of children in the AFDC 
programme were not identified and of those that were, many failed to make regular 
child support payments. More rigorous procedures were now introduced. States were 
required to overhaul their generally lax approach to paternity determination and even 
to impose sanctions on clients who failed to identify the child’s father. They were 
authorized to use mandatory blood tests to establish paternity and to introduce new 
maternity hospital based procedures to facilitate the recording of the father’s identity. 
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With regard to child support enforcement, the states were required to establish 
centralized and automated data systems that would track fathers through their place of 
employment, and permit automatic payroll deductions. States could also withhold 
driver’s licenses as well as recreational licenses to noncompliant fathers and were 
permitted to enlist the support of Credit Bureaus to secure funds. They could also 
withhold or refuse to renew practice licenses from non-compliant fathers in 
professional occupations. Procedures to improve cooperation between the different 
states in locating non-compliant fathers were also introduced. Of course, these 
provisions were not only intended to facilitate child support payments to clients 
receiving benefits but to help all families qualifying for child support. In addition, 
mothers receiving TANF benefits were permitted to retain a larger share of child 
support payments. Under the AFDC programme, child support was paid to the state 
government and only a small amount was passed on to the mother.  
 
The legislation also made funds available for educational programmes that addressed 
the increase in illegitimacy. The numbers of non-marital births had risen steadily over 
the years and attracted increasing media and public attention. By the end of 1990s, 
approximately a third of all children in the United States were born to mothers who 
had never married. Although 72 percent of these births were to mothers over the age 
of 20, many regarded the incidence of non-marital births to single teen parents as a 
particularly pressing social problem.10 The bill’s sponsors had originally proposed that 
no benefits be paid to teen parents, and that additional benefit increases be denied to 
clients who had additional children. This latter provision is known as the ‘family cap’. 
But both proposals were defeated. However, the states were permitted at their own 
discretion to impose these requirements and, in addition $50 million was allocated to 
promote marriage and abstinence education. States that recorded steady annual 
declines in illegitimacy rates were eligible for an incentive payment of $25 million.  
 
The issue of medical care for poor families was hotly disputed during debates on the 
bill. Medicaid is a joint federal-state means tested programme which had been 
established by the Johnson administration in the 1960s. Under the programme’s 
matching funding formula, higher income states meet a significant proportion of its 
costs. Many state governments wished to take control of the programme primarily to 
contain costs which had risen steeply. Although the Republican majority intended to 
devolve Medicaid to the states, Democrats fiercely opposed this proposal claiming 
that many states would simply slash budgetary allocations and leave many poor lone 
mothers and children without adequate medical care. They claimed that the provision 
of adequate medical care was an important work support since few poor families were 
able to afford occupationally based or private insurance premiums. Eventually, 
proposals to block grant the programme were dropped but some additional funds were 
made available to help the states meet the programme’s rising administrative costs. 
Rules governing the termination of Medicaid payments to former welfare recipients 
whose incomes increase above the Medicaid eligibility limit were also relaxed. As 
                                              
10  However, the rate of non-marital births had actually been declining since the early 1990s, 
before the enactment of the welfare reform legislation. 
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will be shown later, new legislation was also introduced after President Clinton’s re-
election in 1996 to increase access to medical care for the children of low-income 
families through the SCHIP initiative. 
 
Administration, funding and evaluation 
The numerous and complex provisions of the statute placed considerable 
administrative demands on the states. The TANF programme involved the first major 
devolution of a social programme to the states since the ‘New Federalism’ of the 
Reagan era and sizable resources were needed to implement its provisions. Each state 
was required to submit a plan for implementing the new TANF programme to the 
federal government’s Department of Health and Human Services and to enact its own 
legislation which would implement the plan’s provisions. Although the states were 
required to meet a number of new mandates, they were also permitted, as was 
mentioned earlier, to interpret the statute in ways that was suited to local needs and 
conditions.  
 
A major innovation which has since become a major thrust of social policy in the 
United States was a relatively obscure provision in the legislation known as 
‘charitable choice’. It permitted the state governments to contract for services with 
religious organizations without requiring them strictly to separate their social service 
and sectarian activities. Contracting for services has been a feature of social service 
administration in the United States for many years and both non-profit and 
commercial providers regularly submit bids to manage a variety of social programmes 
particularly at the local level. Initially, non-profit organizations dominated the field 
but the involvement of commercial firms has increased rapidly. Many non-profit 
contactors are well-known and highly respected social service agencies affiliated with 
the major religious denominations. However, in keeping with the country’s 
constitutional tradition of separating church and state, these organizations have 
maintained a clear distinction between their religious and welfare functions. Indeed, 
separating social service and religious activities was generally regarded as a 
requirement for successfully contacting. The new legislation radically altered this 
practice and for the first time, contracting with organizations that explicitly 
incorporate religious activities into their social service programmes was now 
permitted. Although this new provision attracted little attention at the time, it created a 
precedent in American social welfare which some believe is unconstitutional. As is 
well known, the current Bush administration has since expanded this idea and the faith 
based principle became a defining feature of the President’s approach to social policy.   
 
The legislation also imposed new reporting requirements on the states and funds were 
allocated to permit in depth evaluation studies that would assess the impact of the 
TANF programme. Over the years, the importance of carefully evaluating the 
outcomes of social policy innovations has been generally acknowledged but, as is 
widely recognized, outcomes research has not always met rigorous standards. On the 
other hand, the flurry of studies undertaken in the early 1990s to assess the effects of 
the JOBS programme had shown that useful results could be obtained through 
carefully designed evaluation research. Accordingly, resources were allocated to fund 
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a variety of outcome studies. The Census Bureau was given $10 million per annum to 
track low income families including those who had received welfare benefits and the 
federal department of Health and Human Services was provided with funds to 
undertake its own studies and to contract with various research organizations to assess 
the TANF programme’s effectiveness. 
 
Although significant additional budgetary allocations were made to fund the welfare 
reform initiative, the Republicans had originally intended to save money through 
devolution. Part of the devolution initiative involved a reduction of federal funds 
allocated to the new state block grants as well as cuts to the other programmes they 
intended to devolve to the states. Although this proposal did not pass, the Republicans 
were able to secure Democrat support for a number of comparatively minor budgetary 
reductions to programmes such as Food Stamps and nutritional supplements to the 
elderly and the EITC. These cuts would not only contain public spending but release 
resources to fund the various new initiatives which the legislation had introduced.  
 
Wider economic policy developments 
In addition to creating a variety of work supports and incentives, the TANF 
programme has been supplemented by new policies and programmes that have not 
only benefited welfare recipients but many other low-income families as well. These 
were introduced primarily during President Clinton’s second term. They facilitated 
remunerative employment and gave expression to the President’s original campaign 
promise of making work pay. In addition, the economic situation improved 
dramatically during the mid and late 1990s creating millions of new jobs, reducing 
unemployment to unprecedented levels and raising average incomes for the first time 
in many years. 
 
As may be expected, the contribution of the President’s economic stimulus package 
which was mentioned earlier has been disputed. While his supporters claim that it 
brought the country out of the recession of the early 1990s, others contend that the 
American market economy was sufficiently resilient to recover on its own. However, 
irrespective of the role of the stimulus package, there is no doubt that the Clinton 
administration’s policy decisions contributed to an improved business climate and the 
economic boom of the mid and late 1990s. The administration gave high priority to 
reducing the budget deficit it had inherited from its predecessors and together with 
low interest rates, a favourable business climate emerged. In addition, President 
Clinton developed a close working relationship with Alan Greenspan, the Federal 
Reserve Bank chairman and he appointed a respected Wall Street insider, Robert 
Rubin to serve as Secretary of the Treasury. At the time, the use of computer and 
internet technologies increased rapidly and the country’s long decline in productivity 
was reversed. 
 
In addition to these wider economic improvements, the Clinton administration’s 
policies also contributed to rising living standards particularly among lower income 
earners. As was reported earlier, the EITC was expanded early in the President first 
term and soon after being re-elected in 1996, the minimum wage was also increased. 
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The EITC which was introduced in 1975, provides a refundable cash benefit to low 
income families in the form of a tax credit. It is administered by the Internal Revenue 
Service. The value of the credit increases as earnings increase but, as earnings rise 
further, it is gradually phased out. The value of the credit is higher for two child than 
one child households. Households without children are also eligible but only a 
comparatively small benefit is paid. Of course, the EITC is only available to those 
who complete a tax return and who apply for a refund. There is evidence to show that 
knowledge of the EITC has increased significantly over the years and that the majority 
of eligible low paid workers do apply and that most receive the credit in the form of a 
lump sum payment.  
 
Soon after President Clinton’s election in 1992, the amount of the credit was increased 
to $3,556 for a family with two or more children. By 2000, the credit had increased to 
$4,008 for a family with two or more children. These increases have raised the total 
cost of the EITC from about $7.5 billion in 1990 to $about 30 billion by the end of the 
decade. By this time, the EITC was being claimed by more than 20 million taxpayers 
– an increase of about 70% from the approximately seven million claiming the EITC 
in 1990. In addition, thirteen states have augmented the federal credit with their own 
EITC programmes. It is widely agreed that the expansion of the EITC has 
significantly reduced the incidence of poverty among low income earners. Indeed, 
some experts (Hoffman and Seidman, 2003) have estimated that more than four 
million people have been lifted above the poverty line as a result of its expansion.  
 
The incomes of poor families were also supplemented through the tax system in other 
ways. One of these was the child credit. Although a deduction set against income for 
dependent children had been permitted for many years, a new $500 credit against 
actual tax liability was introduced in 1998. The Clinton administration proposed that 
the credit, like the EITC, be refundable. This proposal was rejected and it was only in 
2003, following relentless pressure from the Democrats that a partially refundable 
credit was introduced. The value of the credit was also raised to $1,000. Other tax 
advantaged innovations were a new non-refundable tax credit known as the 
Dependent Child Care Tax Credit (DCTC) and a new income deductible child care 
savings account programme that allowed employees to set aside a monthly tax 
advantaged contribution to meet child care expenses. Generally, these latter provisions 
have benefited middle and high income families (Cherry, 2007).  
 
Although the Republican majority in Congress resisted proposals to increase the 
minimum wage, a two step increase from $4.25 per hour to $4.75 per hour and then to 
$5.15 per hour was approved soon after the President’s re-election. However, it was 
only in 2007 that the minimum wage was raised again, this time the by new 
Democratic majority to $5.85 per hour and it will increase to $6.55 per hour in July, 
2008. In the interim, a number of states either raised their own minimum wage, or 
enacted minimum wage legislation. By 2006, thirteen states had adopted minimum 
wage provisions which augment the federal mandate, and during the Congressional 
elections of 2006, voters in another six states approved referenda proposals to 
introduce a local minimum wage. In, addition a number of cities have introduced their 
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own living wage ordinances that require firms contracting with the city government to 
pay their workers specified minimum wages. 
 
The passage of the Workforce Investment Act in 1998 was another important 
development which overhauled local existing job referral, search, placement and 
training programmes as well as the processing of unemployment insurance 
applications. Although not intended specifically to serve welfare recipients, they are 
given priority with job searches and referral. Priority is also given to low income 
families seeking assistance of this kind. Local employment services had become 
fragmented over the years and the legislation sought to improve their coordination and 
service delivery. It created local ‘one-stop’ job and advice centres where all 
employment related services would be located. Close links with local businesses were 
also established and their representatives were invited to play a significant role in the 
administration of the programme and the improvement of local employment services 
through serving on local Private Industry Councils (PICs). Although these 
programmes also implemented the work first philosophy, they were given greater 
discretion in allocating funds for education and job training and particularly for 
vocational training.  
 
In addition to these income subsidies and supports, a number of other policies have 
further helped the Clinton administration to meet its commitment to make work pay. 
One of these was the creation in 1997 of the State Child Health Insurance Programme 
(also known as SCHIP) which was mentioned earlier. The programme extended 
medical care to families with children who do not qualify for Medicaid but who 
cannot afford occupational or private insurance. Additional funds were made available 
to the states which were permitted to fashion their own programmes either by 
establishing entirely new programmes or extending their existing Medicaid provisions. 
SCHIP has proved to be extremely popular and enrolment among families in the range 
of 200 per cent of the poverty line has increased significantly. By 2003, about four 
million additional children had been covered reducing the number of uninsured 
Americans by about 12 percent. However, proposals by the Democrats to further 
expand the programme in 2007 were vetoed by President Bush. Also relevant is the 
increase in funding for the federal government’s Head Start programme and the 
expansion of state subsidized preschool programmes which have garnered growing 
public support in recent years.  
 
Finally, in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration used its executive authority to 
ensure that eligible poor families had improved access to Food Stamps. Following the 
introduction of the TANF programme, applications for Food Stamps had declined and 
it became apparent that many poor families were being discouraged from applying. 
The situation in New York attracted some media attention as it was discovered that 
many eligible families were being told that they no longer qualified for Food Stamps 
under the new welfare reform rules. Although Mayor Guiliani justified these actions 
on the ground that the provision of Food Stamps perpetuated the culture of 
dependency, the intervention of the federal government and threats by activists to take 
the matter to the Courts reversed the policy. Gradually, similar declines in other parts 
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of the country were addressed and the programme’s goal of subsidizing low income 
families and meeting their nutritional needs was reasserted.     
 
Implementing Welfare Reform 
It was noted previously that the state governments were required to formulate plans 
for implementing the TANF programme. These plans were reviewed by the federal 
government to ensure compliance with the legislation and then formed the basis for 
state legislation which was adopted throughout the country soon after the enactment of 
the federal statute. It soon became clear that there were significant differences 
between the TANF programmes introduced by the different states. Since the role of 
the state governments in determining policy expanded considerably with devolution, 
they were no longer narrowly bound by federal rules and many exercised their new 
autonomy and fashioned their own programmes. As was noted earlier, many also 
made creative use of the programme’s funding mechanism. Consequently, different 
approaches may be discerned in the way the programme has been implemented. While 
some states have stressed the TANF programme’s conditionality requirements and 
emphasized its stringent work first philosophy, others have sought to prioritize its 
work support aspects. Yet others have used the programme to facilitate significant 
caseload reductions. These variations have further complicated the process of welfare 
reform in the United States. 
 
Devolution developments 
Since the creation of the state TANF programmes, different interpretations of the 
federal statute and different evolving administrative and political practices have 
reinforced devolution and the divergence of state policies. The result of this 
‘devolution revolution’ as it has been called, is that the national TANF programme has 
now arguably evolved into 50 separate state programmes. For this reason, 
commentators such as Gretchen Rowe and Linda Gianarelli (2006) believe that it is no 
longer possible to make any universally applicable statement about welfare and 
welfare reform in the United States. Although this may be an overstatement, it is true 
that there are now major differences between the different state welfare programmes.  
 
Devolution has been augmented by the further devolution in some states of the TANF 
programme from the state to county and city governments. Although a number of state 
governments implement the TANF programme directly through a network of 
decentralized local offices, many others have devolved the programme further so that 
counties and cities are now primarily responsible for the programme. States such as 
Texas have a centralized system while others such as California have what is known 
as a county-administered system. In this latter case, the counties and cities have 
themselves interpreted the federal and state legislation in different ways and some 
have even used their own revenues to supplement the programme.  
 
The diversification of the programme has also been facilitated by the new funding 
formula which has permitted the state governments to use resources in innovative 
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ways. In addition to having considerable flexibility in the way they spend federal 
resources, it was noted earlier that state ‘maintenance of effort’ funds are no longer 
directly matched with federal allocations, and they are not subject to stringent federal 
rules. Accordingly, the state governments have spent these funds in ways that diverge 
significantly from the spirit of the federal statute. Some states have allocated 
maintenance of effort funds to provide job training and access to educational 
programmes in excess of the amount of time permitted under the federal rules. Some 
have also used their own funds to modify sanction requirements and address the 
problems created by the federal time limit.  
 
Generally, the new TANF programme has been adequately funded at least with regard 
to its benefit obligations. At the time that the welfare reform legislation was being 
debated in Congress, many state governors were concerned that the new block grants 
would not meet benefit obligations. Some were worried that the apparent economic 
recovery of the mid-1990s would not be sustained and, if conditions worsened, the 
states would have to assume responsibility for what had previously been a federal 
obligation. However, many were reassured when it was agreed that the new block 
grants would be funded for five years at the 1994 AFDC level. In fact, it soon became 
apparent that the block grants were more than adequate to meet the programme’s 
needs. As the numbers of welfare clients declined during the mid and late 1990s, the 
new funding formula produced sizable surpluses. Despite these surpluses, benefit 
levels are comparatively low. In 2003, thirteen states, mostly in the South, paid less 
than $300 per month for a family of three. 24 states paid between $300 and $500 per 
month and the remaining paid more than $500 per month. Only a handful of states 
such as Alaska, California, and some of the smaller New England states paid in excess 
of $600 per month (Rowe and Gianarelli, 2006).  
 
TANF surpluses have been used in different ways by different states. Many have 
allocated additional funds to childcare and other employment support programmes. 
New counselling and other social service programmes designed to meet the needs of 
clients facing particular challenges related to psychological and emotional problems, 
substance abuse and domestic violence have been created. Funds have also been used 
to enhance monitoring and tracking procedures and to improve the educational 
qualifications and skills of the staff responsible for implementing the TANF 
programme. However, it is clear that the states would have faced major funding 
challenges in the absence of the surpluses resulting from higher than expected 
caseload reductions. 
 
The devolution of the programme has required significant changes in the way the old 
AFDC programme operated and this has resulted in a major administrative 
restructuring of state, county and city programmes. It has also required staff retraining 
and the creation of new monitoring and tracking procedures. These innovations have 
required significant budgetary allocations. In addition, many states have incurred costs 
as well as administrative challenges in tracking clients and ensuring that those who 
move residence comply with the programme’s work participation and other 
requirements. California attempted to establish a computerized, state-wide tracking 
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system but because of the high cost and implementation difficulties, the system is still 
not in operation. Accordingly, the state is not able to report with certainty the number 
of clients who have exceeded the programme’s lifetime time limits (Crow and 
Anderson, 2004). 
 
It has been reported that there has been a significant shift around the country in the 
way the staff responsible for the programme’s day to day ‘street level’ administration 
have made a major readjustment to give priority to the TANF programme’s work first 
philosophy (Lurie, 2006). Previously, under the AFDC programme, the staff had been 
almost exclusively concerned with determining benefit eligibility but with the new 
emphasis on work promotion, they are now required to assist clients to find jobs and 
to provide various other employment related services. This obviously requires new 
skills and expertise. Many states have introduced new in-service courses or otherwise 
contracted with community colleges and other educational institutions to retrain their 
staff and prepare them for this task.  
 
Meeting federal work participation targets became a top priority for all the states. Staff 
were urged not only to pressure their clients to find employment but to urge them to 
declare any form of paid work in which they were illicitly engaged. As was noted 
earlier, several studies of AFDC recipients (Edin and Lein, 1997; Harris, 1993; Rank, 
1994) found that most were working clandestinely but on a part time and intermittent 
basis in various low wage jobs which they did not report. Since caseworkers were not 
usually unaware of these activities, clients were now encouraged to declare these 
earnings since this would count towards the work participation requirement and 
facilitate the payment of benefits. Although not widely recognized, the disclosure of 
these activities significantly increased work participation rates through administrative 
means. Of course, staff were also urged to help unemployed clients seek work and to 
refer them to potential employers or otherwise the local job and advice centres 
established in terms of the Workforce Investment Act.  
 
Many states have contracted with non-profit and commercial providers to administer 
different components of the new TANF programme. Monitoring compliance and 
providing additional counselling and job referral and placement services has been 
widely contracted out to these providers. In addition, as was noted earlier, faith-based 
organizations have been given new rights to integrate their religious and social service 
functions. However, relatively little is known about the cost-effectiveness of the 
contracting system and about whether the state and county governments have in fact 
accrued significant savings by transferring functions previously carried out by 
governmental employees to non-profit and commercial providers.  
 
Most states have given high priority to expanding subsidized child care and to 
enforcing child support collection procedures. As was noted earlier, many states 
allocated surplus TANF funds to extend childcare subsidies to low income families 
and in Congress, the Democrats continued to advocate vigorously for increased 
childcare funding. The result was that federal as well as state spending on childcare 
rose to $12.3 billion by 2003 (Cherry, 2007). Although this figure is a substantial 
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increase over the amount spent on childcare when the TANF programme was 
introduced, it has not been raised significantly since then. Nevertheless, many believe 
that many more former welfare recipients as well as low income families generally 
now have far better access to childcare although there are still concerns about the 
quality of these services. Only a comparatively small proportion of children attend 
well-run and properly regulated day care centres, and little is known about the 
adequacy of non-centre services. Recently, a number of state governments have begun 
to expand preschool day care and educational programmes with the intention of 
increasing access to centre based care (Kirp, 2007) and, in addition, funding for the 
federal government’s Head Start programme has risen further. 
 
Improved child support enforcement procedures have produced significantly higher 
collection rates in most of the states. Compared to 1994, when about 18 percent of 
mothers received child support, the figure reached 51 percent by 2004. In cases where 
court orders have been issued, the collection rate has also improved with the result 
that approximately 70 percent of fathers now comply with child support orders 
(Cherry, 2007). In addition, as a result of the rules that permit TANF recipients to 
retain a larger share of child support payments, their incomes have also increased and 
this has even facilitated exit from the programme. 
 
Although devolution has fostered the emergence of very different state programmes, 
the federal government has not abrogated its own responsibilities. It requires regular 
reporting, maintains oversight and uses its budgetary authority and control over TANF 
resources to ensure compliance with the programme’s requirements. Despite 
permitting the states to interpret the federal statute in different ways, some aspects of 
the programme that foster national social policy goals have been prioritized by both 
the Clinton and Bush administrations. As had been shown earlier, the Clinton 
administration linked welfare reform to national economic and income policy 
innovations that sought to promote employment and raise incomes and standards of 
living among low-wage workers. On the other hand, the Bush administration stressed 
marriage promotion and the expansion of the role of faith based organizations in 
social service delivery. Both subsequently became national priorities. 
 
Immigration is another issue under the purview of the federal government. As was 
reported previously, noncitizens were explicitly excluded from receiving TANF 
benefits and they were also prohibited from receiving Food Stamps, Medicaid and 
SSI. After President Clinton’s re-election in 1996, these prohibitions were relaxed and 
the states were given discretionary authority to provide Food Stamps and TANF 
benefits to immigrants after five years of continuous residence. During the Bush 
administration’s first term, food stamp eligibility for immigrants was further relaxed 
and states were provided with additional funding to publicize the programme in the 
hope that more applications would be received. This initiative formed part of a wider 
campaign to increase participation in the programme and by the end of 2004, it had 
largely succeeded as the number recipients again rose to levels recorded in the early 
1990s. However, it appears that many who are eligible Food Stamps still do not apply. 
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It was noted earlier that the TANF programme was funded for five years and 
accordingly, at the turn of the new century, reauthorization debates were initiated in 
the Congress. However, the Republicans and Democrats again disagreed sharply about 
key aspects of the programme. The Republicans insisted that work participation 
requirements be increased from 30 hours per week for 50 percent of the caseload to 40 
hours per week for 70 per cent of the caseload. The Democrats opposed these tougher 
work participation requirements but more importantly they campaigned for significant 
increases for childcare funding. It soon became clear that differences between the two 
parties could not be resolved and funding was extended on a temporary basis for one 
year. In fact, further temporary extensions were approved until 2005 when a 
compromise was reached and the programme was again reauthorized. Work 
participation rates were increased to 30 hours per week for 70 percent of the caseload 
but childcare funding was not increased. The new provisions also tightened up what 
many Republicans saw as violations of the original legislation. As will be shown, a 
number of states had significantly diluted the provisions of the TANF programme. On 
the other hand, additional exemptions were introduced in response to pressure from 
the Democrats producing a complex and increasingly impenetrable regulatory system. 
 
State implementation variations 
Despite complying with the most important mandates of the federal statute, and 
sharing common features, the federal government’s express commitment to devolution 
as well as greater state control over maintenance of effort funds allowed the states to 
shape the programme in different ways. As was discussed earlier, this resulted in the 
emergence of quite different programmes in the different states. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to discern some common approaches and trends among different clusters of 
states. Although the situation is not as clear-cut as the following might suggest, it is 
possible to identify four major approaches of this kind. 
 
First, some states have clearly been committed to implementing the programme’s 
tough, work first philosophy. These states have been true to its original intention to 
change the behaviour of welfare recipients and move them from dependency into 
employment and self-sufficiency. Staff have been trained to give high priority to job 
referral and placement and to collaborate with local job centres to increase work 
participation. In many cases they impose a ‘job search’ requirement by refusing to 
review new applications unless the applicant is already registered with the job centre 
and is actively seeking work. These states are also faithful to the TANF programme’s 
work participation requirements and minimize the use of exemptions that permit 
clients to receive benefits without working. Although they impose sanctions, these are 
used to shape behaviour by reducing benefits for limited periods of time in the hope 
that the client will return to compliance again. Examples include Georgia, Illinois, 
Missouri, New Jersey and Vermont. These states also impose a job search 
requirement. On the other hand, they have comparatively generous earnings disregards 
so that benefits are gradually phased out as clients engage in regular employment. 
Among the most generous is Virginia which increased its earnings income disregard 
by almost 250 percent in recent years. All these provisions are designed to promote 
work as well as positive work habits among those applying for and receiving benefits. 
 27
Second, some states have deliberately used the programme’s conditionalities and strict 
requirements to achieve rapid caseload reductions. They have not been primarily 
concerned with behavioural modification and have sought instead to terminate 
benefits for existing clients and to deter new applicants. Instead of ensuring that 
clients engage in regular employment and become self-sufficient, they measure 
success through the number of clients who are expelled from the caseload. These 
states impose strict conditionality requirements which are often difficult to meet and 
which trigger sanctions and facilitate expulsion. They often set more stringent work 
participation standards than prescribed by the federal statute, and impose a shorter 
lifetime time limit. Otherwise, they have introduced intermittent time limits by which 
applicants can only receive benefits for specified periods of time. For example, they 
permit clients to draw benefits for twelve months followed by 24 months of 
ineligibility. Examples include Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Texas. Some states also impose a variety of strict conditionalities accompanied by 
severe sanctions. In these states, even one non-compliance event results in the full 
termination rather than a reduction of benefits.11 Examples include Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Mississippi, Maryland, Oklahoma and Tennessee. Many of these states do not 
have a formula by which benefits are gradually reduced as earnings increase and 
instead, benefits are immediately terminated when clients reaches a fairly low income 
threshold. They also make use of what is known as ‘diversionary’ payments to 
discourage new applications. Those seeking assistance are offered a lump sum cash 
payment on condition that they do not apply for benefits during a specified time 
period. Of the twenty seven states currently using diversionary payments, some such 
as Florida, Hawaii, Idaho and Maryland also use severe sanctions. Finally, states 
committed to a caseload reduction approach have trained their staff to use various 
tactics to deter needy people from applying for benefits and to facilitate exit from the 
programme. These ‘hassle’ techniques as they are known include unresponsiveness, 
excessive demands for documentation and even rudeness and intimidation. 
 
Third, while complying with the general thrust of the TANF programme, some states 
have been comparatively generous and flexible and have not rigidly imposed the work 
first requirement nor made excessive use of sanctions. Although these states are 
committed to increasing work participation and provide a range of services to achieve 
this goal, they use sanctions sparingly and only impose limited benefit reductions. In a 
few cases such as California and Massachusetts, sanctions never involve the full 
withdrawal of benefits. In California even the most flagrant noncompliance can only 
result in a benefit reduction of 19 percent. Massachusetts does not impose any benefit 
reduction at all. Some states such as Arizona, Connecticut and Pennsylvania do not 
impose a minimum work participation requirement but permit caseworkers to use 
discretion in setting work prescriptions for different clients. Some states have also 
devised innovative ways of circumventing the federal time limits. As time limits 
                                              
11  The complete termination of TANF benefits is known as a ‘full family’ sanction. Although 
the majority of states permit full family sanctions, a significant number continue to pay a 
proportion of the benefit primarily to protect children. In these cases, it is usually the adult 
portion of the benefit that is terminated.  
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began to affect some particularly hard to serve clients at the beginning of the new 
century, these clients were transferred out of the TANF programme into programmes 
funded by state funds that do not impose time limits. For example, New York used its 
own funds to create a new programme known as the Safety Net Assistance Program 
which does not have time limits. California and Michigan have established similar 
programmes. 12 
 
Although these states have been criticized for violating the spirit of the federal statute 
by creating alternative programmes that circumvent federal requirements, supporters 
counter that a more flexible approach is needed if welfare recipients are to be assisted 
to engage in regular employment. In addition, in some states such as California and 
New York, political opposition to the stringent work first requirements of the TANF 
programme, as well as Democratic party control over the state legislature has been 
conducive to the adoption of a more liberal approach, particularly with regard to 
protecting children. Major Californian cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco 
have a highly visible population of homeless people, and the prospect of small 
children begging on the streets is something the state’s political leaders are anxious to 
avoid. Similarly, these states have also been more generous to immigrants permitting 
them to receive benefits within the limits set by the federal government. 
 
Finally, a few states have sought to combine work participation with a variety of 
policies and programmes that create incentives, invest in education and job training 
and provide work supports. Although they are officially committed to the work first 
model, their emphasis on incentives and investments departs significantly from the 
programme’s paternalistic provisions. They emphasize job-training and educational 
qualifications as a condition of successful, sustainable employment and believe that 
welfare recipients as well as low income families require a range of supports that will 
make work pay. These states have used their own funds to allow clients to enrol in 
educational and job-training programmes in excess of the federal provision. They have 
also made extensive use of counselling and social service programmes to assist hard to 
serve clients and their families, and to address the barriers that impede employment. 
These ‘barrier reduction’ programmes as they are known, include special services for 
clients with learning disabilities, substance abuse and mental health counselling and 
social work interventions to address family violence and other problems. These states 
give high priority to childcare and also combine their welfare to work programmes 
with wider work supports. In many cases, they have their own income tax credit and 
minimum wage standards which exceed the federal level. However, relatively few 
states have implemented a social investment approach of this kind. One example is 
Minnesota’s Family Investment Program which has used a multi-pronged strategy of 
                                              
12  By shifting these families out of the TANF programme into state welfare programmes, state 
governments could claim that they had reduced the caseload even when this had been 
achieved through administrative means. In 2002, when caseloads around the country were 
increasing due to the short-lived post-September 11th recession, New York’s reported a 
caseload decline of 17 per cent. But, as Douglas Besharov (2002) revealed in an article in the 
Washington Post, this caseload reduction was primarily because 43,000 families were moved 
out of the TANF programme to the state’s own Safety Net Assistance Program.  
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employment counselling, job referral and training and education coupled with a 
generous income disregard and the provision of childcare. The programme has been 
positively evaluated (Knox, Miller and Gennetian, 2000) but it is expensive especially 
when compared to the caseload reduction approach. 
 
Welfare Reform Outcomes and Interpretations 
The significant resources allocated for the evaluation of the TANF programme have 
produced a plethora of studies that have shed a good deal of light on the programme’s 
impact. These studies have been undertaken by university scholars and researchers at 
foundations and think tanks. The Census Bureau, the General Accounting Office and 
the Department of Health and Human Services have also undertaken numerous 
outcome studies. In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services has 
contracted with a number of major research organizations including the Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation and the Urban Institute for evaluation research.  
 
However, it should be recognized that scholars engaged in outcomes research have 
faced formidable methodological challenges in, for example, tracking former welfare 
recipients and measuring incomes and documenting living conditions. But these 
limitations are generally not emphasized and often the findings of outcome studies are 
uncritically accepted. Despite these limitations, many policy relevant conclusions 
about the TANF programme’s effectiveness have been drawn and unqualified 
statements about its effects have been published. The fact that it is extremely difficult 
to undertake accurate and reliable research on the incomes and living standards of 
families, and particularly of those families that move residence regularly, is seldom 
mentioned. 
 
The sizable volume of published research on the TANF programme and its outcomes 
also poses challenges to anyone seeking to summarize these findings and reach 
general conclusions. Fortunately, a number of useful meta-studies, based on the 
findings of numerous separate studies have been undertaken and they have attempted 
to discern general trends. However, the findings of these studies have been interpreted 
differently. It is clear that the facts do not speak for themselves but are often 
marshalled in ways that tend to reinforce preconceptions and preferences. 
Nevertheless, by reviewing these studies as well as the way they have been 
interpreted, some broad conclusions about the impact of the TANF programme and 
the other welfare policy innovations introduced in the mid-1990s can be reached.  
 
The outcome of the TANF Programme 
It is possible to discern at least four different approaches used by researchers 
investigating the TANF programme and its outcomes. First, a number of studies have 
focused on caseload trends and particularly on the significant caseload declines since 
the mid-1990s. A second group of studies has sought to track former welfare 
recipients and collect information about their employment activities, incomes and 
living conditions in order to determine whether exit from the welfare system has 
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ended dependency and promoted self-sufficiency. A third approach has been to study 
individuals and families currently receiving TANF benefits. A number of these studies 
have focused specifically on clients who have been sanctioned. Finally, some studies 
have used secondary sources to discern general trends with regard to the earnings, 
incomes and social well-being of low-income families. Based on an analysis of these 
trends, inferences about the wider effects of welfare reform have been made. 
 
Routine record keeping data reveal that the numbers of people applying for and 
receiving benefits has declined significantly since the mid-1990s. A number of studies 
have sought to analyze these caseload reductions and to determine reasons for the 
decline. Although it is often implied that these declines began after the introduction of 
the TANF programme, the AFDC caseload had already begun to decline in 1994 – 
three years before the TANF programme actually came into effect. At that time, 
approximately 5.1 million families (or about 14.2 million individuals) were in receipt 
of AFDC benefits.13 Kent Weaver (2000) reported that the numbers receiving TANF 
benefits in 1999 had fallen to about 2.5 million families (or about 6.7 million 
individuals). By 2001, a further decline in the caseload to about 2.1 million families 
(or about 5.6 million individuals) had been recorded (Besharov and Germanis, 2003). 
However, following the recession of the early 1990s, the caseload again increased 
although not significantly. By 2005, the caseload had declined again to about 1.9 
million families and as was reported earlier, in 2008 about 1.7 million families were 
enrolled in the programme. Generally, most analyses conclude that the total caseload 
reduction since 1994 is about 60 percent.  
 
Both the Republicans and Democrats have claimed that the fall in the caseload is due 
to the TANF programme and its work first requirements. However, many scholarly 
accounts suggest that a number of complex factors have contributed to the decline. 
Some argue that the strong economy of the 1990s and the creation of millions of new 
jobs drew welfare recipients out of the TANF programme into regular employment. 
Others dispute this claim using historical data to show that periods of economic 
expansion in the 1980s did not produce significant caseload declines. A strong 
economy, they contend, is unlikely to end welfare dependency and, they insist that it 
is only through the imposition of tough work participation requirements bolstered by 
sanctions that welfare recipients will engage in regular employment. These different 
arguments have been carefully analyzed by Douglas Besharov and his colleague Peter 
Germanis (2000, 2003; Besharov, 2006) who conclude that there are in fact multiple 
reasons for the caseload decline. They believe that economic growth is the single 
largest factor, accounting for between 35 and 45 percent of the decline. However, the 
TANF programme and its work first commitment also played a significant role 
contributing to between 25 and 35 percent of the decline. They also believe that 
incentives associated with President Clinton’s make work pay policies, and 
particularly the EITC, also contributed and explains between 20 to 30 percent of the 
caseload decline.  
                                              
13  The average size of a family receiving AFDC benefits was approximate 2.7 individuals. It 
should be noted that a small number of ‘child only’ benefits were also paid. 
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Although caseload decline is usually cited as the primary indicator of the success of 
the TANF programme, the fact that welfare recipients no longer receive benefits does 
not necessarily mean that they are now working in remunerative jobs and that they are 
self-sufficient and successful. It is for this reason that quite extensive research has 
been undertaken into individuals and families who previously received TANF benefits 
in order to determine whether their incomes and social conditions have improved. 
These ‘leaver studies’ as they are known provide useful information about how former 
recipients have fared since exiting the programme.  
 
Unfortunately, the leavers studies have produced conflicting results. Reviewing a 
number of these studies, some meta-analyses report that the majority of former 
welfare recipients have found work and that they are in regular, remunerative 
employment. These analyses conclude that by compelling welfare recipients to work, 
the TANF programme has not only ended welfare dependency but created an upward 
trajectory towards self-sufficiency. For example, Cherry’s analysis (2007) found that 
the majority of welfare leavers were working regularly and that only a small minority 
had not found employment. He concluded that only about 15 to 20 percent of welfare 
leavers were adversely affected as a result of exiting the TANF programme. However, 
he did find that most leavers were employed in low-wage occupations and his analysis 
stresses the importance of work incentives and supports such as the EITC in 
sustaining an adequate standard living among former recipients. Ron Haskin’s (2006) 
review of the research has also concluded that the TANF programme’s emphasis on 
work first has propelled many people who previously dependent on welfare into 
regular remunerative employment.  
 
Other meta-analyses have reached a less optimistic conclusion. One of the most 
important is by Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest (2004), who examined separate 15 
leaver studies, and found that a minority (40 percent) of welfare leavers had steady, 
regular jobs while about 30 percent worked intermittently. The remainder (30 percent) 
reported no work activity. Besharov and Germanis (2000, 2003) confirm these 
findings. In his latest analysis, Besharov (2006) concludes that no more then 40 to 50 
percent of welfare leavers are in steady, full-time employment. Another 15 percent 
have part-time jobs. Perhaps as many as a third do not work at all and are dependent 
on intermittent child-support payments, in-kind support from friends and relatives and 
on other sources of government aid such as Food Stamps, housing assistance and 
nutritional programmes. 
 
Most meta-analyses of the leaver studies agree that those who work are engaged in 
low-wage employment. Several studies report that most leavers had incomes that were 
only marginally above the poverty line (Brauner and Loprest, 1999; Acs and Loprest, 
2004). Besharov (2006) found that the average wage for welfare leavers was about $8 
per hour or about $16,000 per annum which he concluded “is not a lot of money, 
especially for a mother with two children (p. 2). In one rare study using a control 
group, Pamela Loprest and Sheila Zedlweski (2006) found that wages among current 
welfare recipients and welfare leavers and a control group of low income women who 
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had never received welfare benefits increased in the late 1990s and early years of the 
21st century but were still only in the $6.00 to $8.00 per hour range.  
 
Several studies reveal that many welfare leavers have difficulty meeting their needs. 
Reviewing national data, Loprest (1999) found that about a third of those interviewed 
reported skipping meals or reducing food intake because of insufficient incomes. 
About 38 percent reported that they had difficulty in paying rents and utility bills. 
Indeed, many had defaulted on rent and utility payments since leaving welfare. A 
study undertaken by the General Accounting Office (1999) reached a similar 
conclusion. Loprest and Zedlweski (2006) found that as many as 25 percent of leavers 
faced face significant psychological and educational limitations in securing and 
maintaining steady work and that among this group, food insecurity increased. 
Although it is true that the incomes of many welfare leavers are augmented by the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, child support payments, child care subsidies and other 
sources, the conclusion that former welfare recipients are now self-sufficient and 
enjoying a reasonably comfortable middle class life style is not supported by the 
evidence. These findings have led even some critics of welfare such as Besharov and 
Germanis (2003) to conclude that while welfare reform has not been the social 
catastrophe liberals predicted, “neither has it lifted large numbers of female headed 
households out of poverty (p.53).” 
 
Of course, a significant number of families are currently receiving benefits under the 
TANF programme and a number of studies into their characteristics, incomes and 
living conditions have been undertaken.14 A subgroup of this type of research 
comprises studies into TANF recipients who have been subjected to sanctions. 
Although studies of current TANF programme participants reveal that the majority are 
in compliance with work participation requirements and engage in part-time 
employment while receiving benefits, they too are working in the low-wage economy. 
Despite receiving benefits, a significant number report difficulty in making ends meet. 
An official government study revealed that 13 percent of TANF recipients reported 
falling behind with rent payments, 16 percent could not pay utility bills, 11 percent 
could not afford child care and 6 percent experienced times when they could not 
afford food (US General Accounting Office, 1999). These findings confirm earlier 
studies that showed how difficult it is for current welfare recipients to make ends 
meet.15 
 
Studies of current welfare recipients reveal that many have serious psychological and 
other problems that limit their ability to engage in regular employment (Danziger and 
Seefeldt, 2003; Loprest and Zedlweski, 2006) This is particularly true of clients who 
have been sanctioned. Many encounter serious barriers and trying to balance work and 
                                              
14  Although the caseload has fallen by about 60 percent since 1994, it should be remembered 
that almost two million families still receive benefits today. 
15  Research undertaken before the introduction of the TANF programme found that most of the 
women receiving AFDC and other benefits were struggling to secure a minimum standard of 
living and to cope as best they could (Edin and Lein, 1997; Harris, 1993; Rank, 1994).  
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caring for small children is often a formidable challenge. It is not surprising therefore 
that many are unable to comply with the TANF programme’s requirements. Studies of 
those who had been sanctioned reveal that many are unable to function independently 
on the open job market. These studies also reveal that sanctions seldom resolve the 
problems facing these clients. Indeed, they are often exacerbated endangering children 
who are then brought into the public child welfare system (Lindhorst, Mancoske and 
Kemp, 2000; Ong and Houston, 2005; Reichman, Teitler and Curtis, 2005). 
 
It should also be noted that the current caseload is not static and that a significant 
number of welfare recipients cycle in and out of the TANF programme. In Wisconsin, 
where the state’s TANF programme is said to have been particularly successful, 30 
percent of leavers returned to claim benefits within 15 months (US General 
Accounting Office, 1999). In her nation-wide review, Loprest (1999) found that about 
30 percent of leavers returned to the rolls. In the subsequent study with Acs mentioned 
earlier, it was found that about a quarter of leavers had returned (Acs and Loprest, 
2004). These findings are consistent with earlier research into welfare spells which 
showed that a significant proportion of those who leave welfare do not in fact succeed 
in becoming self-sufficient and that many require assistance again (Bane and Ellwood, 
1994). However, as with the AFDC programme, the proportion of TANF clients who 
remain in the system for extended periods of time is comparatively small.  
 
Finally, research into earnings, incomes and poverty and other indicators of the well-
being of American families have been used to make inferences about the TANF 
programme. These studies often rely on secondary data and are not specifically 
focused on TANF recipients or welfare leavers but they shed light on the programme 
and its wider effects. These studies infer that welfare reform has contributed to 
declines in the poverty rate or the falling rate of non-marital births or improvements in 
the well-being of children or higher standards of food security or the decline in the 
murder rate in American cities. For example, it is claimed that census data show that 
the poverty rate has declined significantly since the mid-1990s and that this can be 
attributed to the higher proportion of women now engaged in regular employment 
(Cherry, 2007; Haskins, 2006). However, the fact that the poverty rate increased again 
in the early years of the 21st century is not always acknowledged. Similarly, careful 
research by Duncan Lindsay and Sacha Klein Martin (2003) into the link between 
welfare receipt and child poverty rates in several states found that the decline in 
welfare rolls was not accompanied by a fall in the child poverty rate. 
 
Another example of the use of indicators of well-being to assess the outcome of 
welfare reform is the work of Christopher Jencks (2005) who has used indicators of 
food security to draw conclusions about the TANF programme’s effects. Although he 
initially criticized the programme, he now believes that it has contributed to 
improvements in nutrition as well as incomes and standards of living. He also believes 
that welfare reform has contributed to the fall in rate of non-marital births. Similarly, 
Besharov and Germanis (2003) point to the programme’s contribution in addressing 
what they describe as the deep-seated, dysfunctional social problems facing low 
income communities. On the other hand, critics of welfare reform such as Joel 
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Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld (2007) are less sanguine. Drawing on a diverse body 
of research, they conclude that the social and economic circumstances of low income 
families have not significantly improved in recent years.  
 
It difficult to reach definite conclusions about the findings of these different studies. 
Indeed, it may be claimed that the sizable resources allocated to evaluations of the 
TANF programme have not produced the desired results and that these funds could 
have been spent more profitably elsewhere. On the other hand, many scholars believe 
that the research has shed light on the programme and that it is possible to reach some 
general, cautious conclusions. First, as indicated earlier, many commentators conclude 
that exit from the TANF programme has not in fact propelled former recipients into 
remunerative employment and a comfortable, middle class lifestyle. On the other 
hand, many also believe that the TANF programme and particularly the work support 
and earnings subsidization policies that accompanied the programme’s introduction 
have contributed to reductions in poverty and modest improvements in living 
standards among former welfare recipients. They point particularly to the positive 
effects of the EITC, improved access to Medicaid, the introduction of the SCHIP 
programme and increases in child care funds which have made it easier for low 
income families and working mothers in particular to secure child care of a reasonably 
good quality for their children. However, these more cautious and guarded 
conclusions are not always communicated to the media or to politicians and instead, 
more sweeping generalizations have been preferred. These reflect the influence of 
ideological preferences in the way ostensibly objective research findings are 
interpreted. 
 
Interpretations 
Sweeping claims about TANF programme have often been made. Indeed, claims of 
this kind were made even before the programme was introduced. Republican House 
Speaker, Newt Gingrich insisted that his party’s welfare to work proposals would 
compel indolent welfare recipients to find employment and that by ending welfare 
dependency, incomes would rise, the poverty rate would fall and the problems of 
crime, marital breakdown and social disorganization facing the country would be 
ameliorated. On the other hand, some Democrats made dire predictions about its likely 
effects on low income families and especially children. Wendell Primus who had 
served on President Clinton’s welfare reform working group produced a statistical 
simulation model to show that as many as two million children would be plunged into 
poverty. His data were frequently quoted by Senator Moynihan who, as was noted 
earlier, made particularly gloomy prediction about the effects of welfare reform on 
poor families and their children. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that these negative predictions had not been 
fulfilled and instead sweeping claims about the programme’s success now began to 
permeate the media. An article in the Washington Post in 1999 claimed that the facts 
about the success of welfare reform were now incontrovertible and, as was noted 
earlier, The Economist described welfare reform as ‘America’s great achievement.’ 
President Clinton himself is reported to have claimed that “The debate is over. We 
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know that welfare reform works” (Schram and Soss, 2002, p. 59). Similarly, Ron 
Haskins (2006) who worked closely with the Republican leadership on the original 
bill declared that the TANF programme brought about the ‘triumph of work over 
welfare’. The programme, he points out, involved sweeping reforms that produced 
sweeping effects. On the other hand, claims about the negative impact of the 
programme have also been made particularly by feminist and multicultural writers 
who believe that welfare reform amounts to a concerted attack on poor women and 
ethnic minorities in an attempt to reassert patriarchal and racist ideologies.  
 
In addition to these sweeping claims, it is possible to identify a number of different 
scholarly interpretations of the findings of the outcomes research reviewed earlier. 
First, there are the optimists who emphasize the positive aspects of welfare reform and 
its role in promoting work, as well as desirable behaviours and values. Second, the 
pessimists take a diametrically opposite point of view claiming that welfare reform 
has been disastrous for low-income families and particularly for women and ethnic 
minorities. A third group are the pragmatists who reflect the generally cautious 
conclusion of the outcome studies mentioned earlier. A fourth group, who will be 
described as sceptics, generally transcend debates about the positive or negative or 
mixed impact of welfare reform and instead emphasize its role in achieving electoral 
and other goals that have little to do with poor women and their daily struggles to fend 
for themselves and their families. 
 
The optimists interpret the research data to claim that welfare reform has, as Haskins 
(2006, p. 362) argued, “produced a host of benefits for poor mothers and the nation.” 
Generally, they project a conceptual image of the typical welfare recipient as a lone 
mother, entirely dependent on benefits who has been corrupted by the welfare system 
but who has now been reformed by the TANF programme’s firm and paternalistic 
provisions. Although the optimists are usually Republicans on the right of the political 
spectrum, President Clinton is himself an optimist and many Democrats have also 
reached favourable conclusions about the outcomes of welfare reform. Cherry (2007), 
who regards himself as a liberal, also sides with the optimists claiming that the 
majority of welfare leavers are now in regular employment and that their standards of 
living have improved significantly. 
 
The optimists contend that even if the findings of the leaver studies are equivocal, the 
caseload reductions that have been achieved are in themselves highly desirable. In 
addition, they accentuate the positive findings of the outcome studies. For example, 
Haskins claims that many more welfare recipients are now in regular employment, 
that earnings have increased and the poverty rate particularly among children has 
fallen. Many commentators have indeed noted the increase in [reported] labour force 
participation among poor women and lone mothers. Rebecca Blank and Lucie 
Schmidt (2001) note that labour force participation among these women had increased 
by about ten percent since the mid-1990s. Loprest and Zedlweski (2006) confirm this 
finding and report a nine percent increase in labour force participation which they 
described as ‘dramatic’. Although Haskins contends that increased work participation 
has resulted in improvements in incomes and a decline in the poverty rate, Blank and 
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Schmidt are more cautious pointing out that improvements in incomes are not due 
only to work participation but to the effects of work support policies such as the 
EITC.16  
 
As noted earlier, the pessimists are generally associated with the ideological left. 
Generally, they subscribe to a conceptual image of the typical welfare recipient as a 
lone mother who does not choose to draw welfare benefits but is compelled to seek 
social assistance primarily to protect her children. Welfare recipients are not indolent 
or irresponsible but rather, as Ruth Sidell (2006) argued, unsung heroes who engage in 
a relentless struggle to cope with adversity. The pessimists cite a number of 
ethnographic studies of the clients of the old AFDC programme to support their 
position. As was mentioned earlier, these studies (Edin and Lein, 1997; Harris, 1993; 
Rank, 1994) found that many AFDC recipients were not idle and entirely dependent 
on welfare but that most were in fact clandestinely employed, although usually in a 
part time capacity and on an intermittent basis. The fact that they were supplementing 
their meagre benefits with part-time employment attests to their resolve and 
determination to provide for their families. Accordingly, they deserve to be helped. In 
fact, the provision of financial aid to these women is desirable not only because it 
gives expression to society’s collective altruistic values, but to the notion that the 
provision of social assistance is an inalienable right of citizenship. 
 
Obviously, the pessimists interpret the outcome studies and secondary data in negative 
ways. They accentuate the fact that a significant proportion of welfare leavers do not 
engage in regular employment and that their earnings from part-time and intermittent 
work are low. Some such as Primus and his colleagues (1999) have produced research 
to show that the incomes of the poorest welfare leavers have in fact declined and that 
these families are significantly worse off than before. They also stress the fact that 
those who do engage in regular employment generally work for low wages. They 
strongly contest the claim that incomes have risen and that the poverty rate has 
declined as a result of welfare reform. Instead, improvements in living standards are 
primarily due to the booming economy of the late 1990s and the incentives and work 
supports introduced by the Clinton administration. They contend that while the 
poverty rate declined steadily during the 1990s, it subsequently increased again. 
Despite the claims of the optimists, the child poverty rate has also increased and 
reached 17.6 percent in 2005. In addition, in excess of 20 per cent of children under 
the age of six were in poverty at this time. This datum, they point out, is far higher 
than in other Western countries and should be viewed as a national disgrace.17 
                                              
16  It should also be noted that these work supports and the TANF programme itself has drawn 
many former welfare recipients out of the underground economy thus resulting in high 
official [reported] participation rates. 
17  As measured by official federal poverty criteria, which many regard and as artificially 
stringent, 12.8 percent of the population of the United States lived below the poverty line in 
1990. This figure dropped to 11.3 percent in 2000 but rose again to 12.6 percent in 2005. This 
translates into approximately 37 million people or almost five million more than in 2000. 
Among children under 18, the poverty rate declined from 19.6 percent to 16.2 percent in 2000 
but rose again to 17.6 percent in 2005. 
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The pessimists have not only interpreted the findings of the outcome studies to show 
that welfare reform has failed to meet its goals, but claim that it reveals ulterior 
motives. A number of feminist scholars including Mimi Abramovitz (1996), 
Gwendoline Mink (1998) and Ellen Reese (2005) are persuaded that the TANF 
programme has been deliberately used to exercise social control over women and their 
lives. As women have become more independent, and challenged institutionalized 
patriarchal beliefs, they have provoked a violent response. Attempts to reverse 
abortion rights, restore women’s’ traditional ‘housewife’ role and continued sexism in 
the workplace are indicative of this response. The TANF programme is just one more 
effort to control and discipline women and to reassert patriarchal authority. It is no 
accident they claim that the AFCD programme which catered primarily for poor, lone 
mother families was singled out for ‘reform’. Other social programmes such as 
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation and Social Security which do not 
serve these women, continue to consume sizable public revenues but have not been 
the object of venomous attacks. 
 
This argument has been extended by Kenneth Neubeck and Noel Cazenave (2001) 
who contend that the TANF programme is an obvious example of what they described 
as ‘welfare racism.’ Drawing on earlier research by Jill Quadagno (1994), they claim 
that American social policy has long given expression to the country’s deeply 
institutionalized racist attitudes and practices. Despite the achievements of the civil 
rights movement, racism still finds expression in all spheres of life and especially in 
the country’s segregated schools, the criminal justice system, in electoral politics, the 
media and in daily social interaction. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that racial 
attitudes should permeate the TANF programme. In particular, the programme gives 
expression to racist attitudes about the alleged promiscuity of African-American 
women, their indolence and deviant behaviour. There is also ample evidence to show 
that the programme is highly discriminatory using sanctions disproportionately against 
people of colour. The fact that most politicians deny that the programme is racist is in 
itself, they claim, highly revealing. 
 
Barbara Ehrenreich (2002a) whose undercover activities as a low-wage worker 
attracted a good deal of media attention (Ehrenreich, 2002b), takes a more 
traditionalist Marxist view claiming that welfare reform should be viewed as one of 
several initiatives directed against workers since the 1970s. Faced with growing 
international competition and falling profits, American corporations have engaged in a 
relentless and largely successful anti-union campaign which has significantly reduced 
the ability of ordinary workers to protect their rights. They and their political allies in 
Congress have deliberately used unemployment to instil fear and to discipline workers 
and, as the labour force has become increasingly compliant and docile, they exacted 
more demanding work but provided fewer benefits, and also increased surveillance 
and control in the workplace. Ehrenreich contends that the TANF programme is just 
another instrument in the hands of corporate interests which disciplines and controls 
employees and, by creating what Marx described as a ‘reserve army’ of workers, 
ensures a ready supply of cheap unskilled labour. Reese (2005) endorses this 
interpretation by arguing that many corporations have not only commended welfare 
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reform but benefited from hiring both current and former welfare recipients at low 
wages. 
 
The pragmatists tend to avoid sweeping generalizations about the success or failure of 
the TANF programme, and have generally reached more cautious and qualified 
conclusions about its impact. They do not have a single conceptual image of the 
welfare recipient but believe that they are comprised of many different types of 
individuals and families. References to ‘welfare recipients’, they point out are 
meaningless because they conceal wide variations among those who receive benefits. 
They agree that there are some welfare recipients who abuse the system and whose 
behaviour should be censured but they also believe that many more benefit from 
temporary financial aid. Most then exit from the welfare system. They cite the earlier 
studies by Bane and Ellwood (1994) on the welfare spells of AFDC recipients to 
support this argument. They also recognized that some welfare recipients face serious 
barriers to employment and require special assistance. Many favour a social 
investment approach which emphasizes job training, as well as incentives and work 
supports. There are, they believe, many examples of former welfare recipients who 
have benefited from temporary assistance.18 While they believe that welfare to work 
programmes can help those in financial difficulty, they generally oppose the 
imposition of stringent requirements and believe that incentives are a more effective 
way of promoting self-sufficiency. They interpret the results of the outcome studies by 
showing that harsh conditionalities have not propelled formal welfare recipients into a 
comfortable middle-class life style but that the extensive work supports and subsidies 
provided through minimum wages, tax credits, adequate child care, educational 
opportunities and health-care have brought real benefits. It is only through wider 
economic and social policies of this kind, they content that the problems of poverty 
and deprivation in American society can be solved. 
 
Finally, unlike the optimists, pessimists and pragmatists the sceptics are not 
particularly concerned with the findings of the outcome studies and are more 
interested in the political and ideological functions of welfare reform. They claim that 
welfare reform is not really about ending welfare dependency or compelling poor 
women to work. Nor is it about addressing the problem of low wages and poverty in 
American society. Why is it, they ask, that welfare reform is focused on only one cash 
transfer programme and that other programmes which in fact consume sizable 
resources remain intact. They also ask why welfare mothers who are supposed to be 
self-sufficient continue to be supported by a variety social programmes such as Food 
Stamps, subsidized child care and the EITC. Although no longer dependent on AFDC 
or TANF benefits, the fact that they are now ‘dependent’ on other welfare 
programmes is seldom mentioned. They also point to the double standards in the 
                                              
18  One is the world renowned author, J. K. Rowling who is former welfare mother. She wrote 
her first Harry Potter novel while receiving benefits and then went on to become a multi-
millionaire with an estimated fortune in excess of $500 million. In addition to becoming 
economically self-sufficient, she has contributed hugely to the international reputation of the 
British publishing industry. 
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welfare debate. While many Republicans and religious traditionalists extol family 
values and the role of women in raising and inculcating positive behaviours in their 
children, these values do not seem to apply to poor women and particular poor women 
or colour who are exhorted to work long hours in low paying jobs which prevent them 
from caring adequately for their children. 
 
Like the pessimists, the sceptics believe that welfare reform has ulterior motives. 
These motives, they agree, reflect popular stereotypic views about poor women and 
particularly women of colour. However, these stereotypes are part of a larger project 
that is primarily concerned with electoral politics and securing and maintaining 
political power. While the AFDC program catered primarily for widows and deserted 
wives, it was uncontroversial. But as more African-American women who had never 
married began to claim benefits, and as this trend was reported in the media, welfare 
became a highly politicized issue. When President Reagan seized the initiative in the 
1980s and demonized the ‘welfare queen’, the Democratic party’s commitment to the 
AFDC programme became a major electoral liability. This was exacerbated by the 
President’s successful electoral onslaught on the Southern states which resulted in 
millions of white voters deserting the party and effectively ending decades of 
Democratic control. President Clinton’s promise to ‘end welfare as we know it’ was 
thus disingenuous since it was not actually designed to deal with welfare dependency 
or poverty among lone mothers but to address what had become a serious electoral 
problem. Clinton’s policy of ending welfare revealed his political mastery in removing 
the issue from the national electoral agenda. Welfare was not debated during either the 
2000 or the 2004 presidential election campaigns. Nor will it be an issue in the 
forthcoming election later this year. The real winners of welfare reform are not the 
mothers who have found work or now benefit from increased child care support or 
who receive EITC subsidies but the hundreds of Democratic congressional members 
and senators who no longer have to wage election campaigns that involve the emotive 
issue of welfare. 
 
Final Thoughts: Relevance for British Social Policy 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, more information about social policy 
innovations in different nations is now being diffused around the world than ever 
before and governments are increasingly adopting social welfare approaches 
emanating from other countries or modifying existing policies in the light of 
developments elsewhere. Innovations in social welfare in the United States have 
attracted a good deal of international attention and have influenced social policy 
formulation in other parts of the world although, of course, these influences have not 
always been welcomed or positively assessed by academic commentators.  
 
The authors of the commentaries following this paper have been asked to reflect on 
the relevance and implications, if any, of American welfare reform for social policy in 
the United Kingdom. The obvious, converse question is whether developments in 
social welfare policy in Britain have implications for the United States. International 
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exchanges in social welfare thinking, and the potential adaptation of policies should 
be a mutually beneficial and reciprocal process. With few exceptions (Hokenstad and 
Midgley, 2004), American social policy scholars have not sought to address the 
question of whether the United States can benefit from the purposeful adoption and 
adaptation of social welfare innovations from other countries and how this can best be 
facilitated and realized. Although there is a growing awareness and interest among 
American social policy scholars in the social policies and programmes of other 
countries, the study of transnational social policy transfers is still in its infancy. The 
same may be said of social policy scholarship in many other parts of the world. 
 
Speculation about the relevance of social policies to other countries should take a 
number of factors into consideration. Obviously the historical institutionalization of 
particular policies as well as broader policy styles and preferences will affect the 
potential adoption of innovations from other countries. Cultural attitudes, values and 
beliefs are obviously also relevance as are political, demographic and economic 
realities. These factors are relevant when considering the implications of American 
welfare reform for Britain. Despite similarities, there are significant historical and 
cultural differences between Britain and the United States. In terms of policy 
preferences, Britain has a longer and more extensive tradition of universalism in social 
welfare than the United States particularly with reference to health-care and social 
insurance. The tendency to lump Britain and the United States together when 
categorizing social welfare systems internationally may be popular but it is 
questionable when these and other social policy approaches are considered. Britain’s 
engagement with Europe is another relevant factor. 
 
Nevertheless, as has been noted already, social policy in Britain over the last decade 
has been influenced by developments in the United States. A recent announcement by 
the leader of the Conservative Party that a new welfare policy based extensively on 
the American experience will be introduced should the party be returned to office at 
the next election suggests that the process will continue.19 Whether this bodes well for 
                                              
19  In January 2008, Mr. David Cameron, the Conservative leader, unveiled new welfare reform 
proposals which, it was pointed out, were based on the successful reforms introduced in 
Australia and the United States where it was claimed that tougher requirements had 
significantly reduced the welfare rolls. It was reported that in Wisconsin alone, the number of 
people on welfare had fallen by 82 percent after work requirements were imposed (Sunday 
Times, 6 January 2008). As in the United States, the Conservative proposals would introduce 
time limits and work participation rules on those receiving the jobseekers allowance and also 
toughen incapacity benefit eligibility requirements. Benefits would be terminated for those 
who failed to comply. In addition, greater use of private contractors would be made. Shortly 
after these proposals were unveiled, the Sunday Telegraph (2008) reported that a poll it had 
commissioned put the Conservative party seven points ahead of Labour – an increase of two 
points since its previous December poll. It also reported that there was significant support 
among likely voters for the party’s welfare reform plans. More than 80 percent of those 
interviewed agreed with the party’s proposals. It is perhaps interesting that these proposals 
were introduced in the wake of Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s announcement in December 
2007 of what The Guardian Weekly newspaper (2007) described as a “raft of initiatives to 
restore confidence in [the Prime Minister’s] leadership.” These included a new commitment 
to addressing the problems of disadvantaged children, further educational reforms, assistance 
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British social policy is a question that the knowledgeable and insightful commentaries 
following this paper are best qualified to answer. 
 
Commentaries 
What have we learned? Kitty Stewart 
Clearly President Clinton’s advocacy of welfare reform had a big impact on New 
Labour’s approach to welfare reform. But the UK government’s starting point was 
different. It began with a commitment to eradicate child poverty rather than to reduce 
welfare roles. As a result, it is no surprise that UK policy was grounded in a range of 
supportive policies – the earned income tax credit, the increase in minimum wage (the 
creation of a minimum wage, indeed), extending financial support for childcare and 
help in finding employment. There were, at least initially, no punitive strategies (time 
limits, sanctions and compulsion) though these have come later. In the paper’s 
classification of the approaches in different states I felt the UK fitted in most closely 
with Minnesota’s “social investment approach”. But even there the UK had wider 
policies to encourage early years education, more to regulate childcare (and much 
more serious financial support for childcare), and additional services for under fives 
through Sure Start. We have also been much more supportive of part-time work as an 
option, with tax credits starting at 16 hours work a week. As a result one of the biggest 
falls in child poverty in the UK has been seen in the case of children living with a lone 
parent who is working part-time.  
 
In addition, the UK had a much more generous strategy for women who do not work. I 
would highlight in particular: 
¾ Increases in universal child benefits, and in income support rates for families with 
children under 11. 
¾ Much more generous support for new babies, aimed at allowing more mothers to 
stay home for a year – in contrast, many states in the US require work within 3 or 
4 months of a newborn’s birth. 
 
Outcomes 
If we compare outcomes for the two countries after a decade or so, I think we find:  
¾ Much more dramatic employment effects in the US, but sharper reductions in child 
poverty in the UK.  
¾ Furthermore, while the official headcount of those in absolute poverty did fall in 
the US, there is some evidence that incomes may have deteriorated for families in 
the bottom fifth (Waldfogel, 2007). In the UK, real income has grown for all 
                                                                                                                                            
for the poor of the developing world, tougher immigration requirements and the construction 
of new ‘supersized’ prisons designed to tackle the problem of jail overcrowding. Future polls 
and, of course, electoral outcomes will no doubt reveal the extent to which these and other 
social policy proposals appeal to voters and influence their political choices. 
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income quintiles since 1997 (although there is some debate about what happened 
at the very bottom where measurement is noisy). This difference is not surprising 
when one considers the differences in approach. Those in the US who went from 
welfare to nothing – Rebecca Blank (2007) calculates that as many as 25% of 
single mothers may now be living without work or welfare  – must have fallen 
from below the poverty line to way below it, though they seem to be invisible in 
many studies. 
¾ At the same time, expenditure studies, like those done by Paul Gregg, Jane 
Waldfogel and Elizabeth Washbrook (2005) in the UK show what the increased 
income in poor families in the UK has been spent on. They show significant 
increases in child related items (in particular children’s clothing and shoes, fruit 
and vegetables, books and magazines, holidays). Comparable US studies 
(Waldfogel, 2007) show much smaller expenditure increases. That which has 
occurred has been spent on work-related items (transport, food away from home 
and childcare) and on housing. Thus the impact on child well-being appears to 
have been very different in the two cases.  
 
What Might we Still Learn? 
Of course, if the policy goal is employment growth or cost reduction , we might want 
to pay more attention to the US experience. As with Midgley’s comment on 
Minnesota, an assessment might conclude that our approach is expensive when 
compared to the caseload reduction approach. However, given that the goal is child 
poverty reduction, it is not clear why we should be looking to take further lessons. Yet 
there are definite indications that that is what we are doing. We have often talked at 
CASE about how people in the UK seem to want European levels of services but US 
tax rates (Glennerster, 2003). Now it seems we want to achieve child poverty rates 
that are ‘among the best in Europe’ using US policies.  
 
We are seeing the introduction of more conditionality and time limits, although these 
are still on quite a different scale to those in the US – lone parents will be moved on to 
a more punitive regime once their youngest child reaches seven. Gordon Brown is also 
testing talk about a “Contract out of Poverty”. It is not yet clear what this will mean 
but it has resonance with the Republican “Contract with America” talked about in the 
paper and is particularly worrying if we are primarily concerned with child poverty. 
The pledge to any individual child may be becoming conditional on their parents’ 
behaviour. 
 
The Conservative welfare reform strategy published in January goes much further in 
seeking lessons from the US (Conservative Party, 2008). The title - ‘Real Welfare 
Reform to Make British Poverty History’ – indicates a policy goal similar to that of 
the government, yet one of the key strands of policy is ‘no participation, no benefits, 
and this is very clearly based on the TANF model.  
 
It is worth noting that we do have a very formalized mechanism for sharing policies 
and learning within the EU: the Open Method of Coordination. There is a process of 
peer review whereby countries host talks on an aspect of social policy and other 
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countries come to comment and discuss how they approach the questions in their own 
country. The website highlights a series of ‘success stories’, where countries have 
changed policy after peer review and examination of policies in other countries. I was 
very interested to see that UK policy on homelessness has influenced policy in both 
Denmark and Romania! But there are no examples of policy in the UK being 
influenced by other countries, as yet. At a seminar with the new Child Poverty Unit 
last week someone asked a question about how far the Unit was finding the OMC 
helpful. The sense was that it was not at all. Indeed, it was unclear whether the Unit 
had even heard of it. Yet Europe’s record on child poverty is much better than the UK, 
and better by far than the USA. The most recent figures from the Luxembourg Income 
Study – for the year 2000 – show 15% of children in the UK and 22% in the US living 
below 50% of median income, while seven EU countries have rates below 10%.  
 
What is still far off the Agenda? 
Even so I do not think we should exaggerate how far the UK is drifting in the US 
direction. The paper is in large part a reminder that we are really a long way away 
from the US story. That is true not just for what we have done but in what is being 
proposed. We are beginning to see attempts to do more about employment 
sustainability and progression for those on low incomes. This is important because of 
concern about lone parents cycling in and out of work. More than half of poor children 
now live in a working household. It is the quality and rewards of work for this group 
which matter. That was notably absent from the paper for the US The paper was also a 
reminder of just how different the two systems still are, and many of the details of the 
TANF would be quite unacceptable here, from requiring mothers of newborns to work 
to the fact that there can be so much variation across identical individuals within an 
area. 
 
I was very interested that programmes have limits to the number of claimants who can 
get benefit for working fewer than 40 hours, for instance, or who can claim while 
training. So identical people showing up at different times can be treated differently – 
opening the way for racist treatment, for example, as Midgley mentions. Similarly the 
limited overall budget for TANF contains the potential for injustice – this does not 
seem to have had much impact in practice because of falling rolls, but in principle a 
potential claimant might simply be too far back in the queue to get assistance. 
 
Some aspects of the US agenda still seem to be off limits here – it is to be hoped.  
 
Devolution and Social Security in the United Kingdom: David Piachaud 
These comments will concentrate on what lessons can be learned from the US 
experience regarding the devolution of welfare from the federal to the state level. 
Midgley’s paper shows that following devolution, a number of differences have 
developed. 
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First, there have been differences in goals and priorities. Some states – Georgia, 
Missouri, New Jersey and Vermont - have given priority to putting ‘work first’ and 
have emphasised behaviour modification. Some, mostly southern states, have 
concentrated on terminating benefits by means of severe conditionality or intermittent 
time limits. Some have been generous and flexible, with only modest sanction on 
those who do not comply – a 19 percent benefit reduction in California. Others have 
invested in education and job training, a social investment approach, for example 
Minnesota.  
 
Second, there are big variations in TANF levels. In thirteen states, the level was under 
$300 per month. In twenty four states the level was between $300 and $500 per 
month. The rest paid over $500 with a few paying over $600.  
 
Three other identified features of US TANF devolution are striking: 
¾ The importance of and differences in ‘street level administration’.  
¾ The extent of contracting for services with non-profit and commercial providers.  
¾ The fact that block grants were meeting all the TANF costs and more, giving states 
considerable leeway and discretion. 
 
What Lessons can be drawn for Britain on devolution? 
At first sight, there seem to be very few. Both social security and income tax are the 
function of the unitary government of the UK, with standard rates throughout the 
realm. Scotland, the most devolved government, has made no proposal to take over 
social security, still less pay for it. Richard Parry discussing devolution and social 
security in Scotland wrote: 
‘Social security is the spectre at the feast. In a settlement short of 
independence, no one wishes to include such a large expenditure total 
that would need to be balanced on the income side. Post-independence, 
the issue of the generosity of benefits would need to be confronted. The 
SNP has campaigned on pension increases financed by oil revenues, but 
these headline amounts are of less and less significance in a benefits 
system dominated by tax credits, income guarantees and the rules for 
occupational pensions. … No one has thought through how a Scottish 
administration would use the policy instruments of social security to 
develop distinctive policies to reflect Scottish wishes and 
circumstances.’ (Parry, Benefits, 12(3): 174) 
 
Yet, there is more variation and devolution in the UK than perhaps meets the eye. This 
can be seen if we start from the reasons why regional difference or devolution – not 
the same thing - may be seen as desirable or attractive. 
 
First, there may be differences in price levels. In the USA as in Britain these are 
generally small. But there is a huge exception in relation to housing costs. Beveridge 
debated whether there should be different amounts for housing in his proposals for 
social insurance but decided against them. Glennerster (2007) called this a critical 
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flaw in the Beveridge Plan. National Assistance went the other way. Now Housing 
Benefit is a huge discriminator between regions. The average expenditure per 
household (not just recipients) in London was twice that in Scotland – about £600 
more per household (averaged over all households, not only housing benefit 
recipients). The variation in TANF rates in the USA may to some degree reflect 
differences in price levels. 
 
Second, there may be differences in other incomes, such as the levels of earnings in 
the area. This can mean replacement ratios – benefits relative to in-work incomes – 
differ markedly. This does not necessarily mean that social security rates should vary 
– for social justice perhaps they should not – but it may justify variation in the 
interests of labour market efficiency. Will there be more pressure for different rates 
across the UK in the future? In the next few years, probably not, because the emphasis 
now is on conditionality. But welfare to work programmes may – sensibly and 
efficiently - be different according to local needs and labour market conditions. If the 
conditions on receipt of benefit can and do vary, pressure to vary benefit rates may be 
slight. In any case, wage rates vary far more across the USA than across the UK. 
 
Yet it is a salutary warning that, with devolution in the USA, TANF levels have come 
to vary far more than could be explained or justified by differences in price levels or 
differences in earnings. Whether or not there ever was a common standard of social 
justice for lone parents in the USA, it does not exist with devolution. 
 
A third reason for regional difference is that other non-social security policies differ 
and have consequences for social security levels. Scotland’s free personal care for 
long-term residents is a clear example. As Richard Parry wrote:  
More social work money from the [Scottish] Executive implied less 
social security money from Westminster. Many Scottish interests argued 
that fairness demanded the transfer of money saved in Attendance 
Allowance into the Scottish budget.’ (Parry, Benefits, 12(3): 173) 
On this the Treasury were intransigent and made no concession. 
 
The US experience suggests that the more social security gets enmeshed with services 
and conditionalities the more there will be de facto devolution even if that is not the 
declared aim. That is an important lesson. 
 
A fourth reason for regional difference is the autonomy, albeit constrained, of street 
level bureaucrats. Regulations may be interpreted differently in different parts of the 
country, reflecting different attitudes of staff. These attitudes may reflect local values 
or customs. An important lesson that can be drawn from the US experience is that 
devolution has allowed the most atavistic prejudices to be turned into accepted 
practice in some states – prejudices that a more centralised system sought to curb.  
 
The fifth reason for difference is the free exercise of autonomy and different political 
priorities in different communities. The most serious lesson that I draw from 
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Midgley’s historical account is that the federal government can easily, without 
apparently very much resistance, accept that this is happening and accept or tolerate 
the variation, inequity or injustice that results, perhaps because it is meted out on an 
unpopular minority. 
 
Associated with that variation, inequity or injustice – the appropriate word is a matter 
of judgement – is the fact that there is little effective monitoring of the variations that 
are occurring – and this in the land more richly endowed with social scientists than 
any other on the planet. 
 
One final lesson can be drawn from the apparent satisfaction of the states with falling 
welfare rolls alongside block grants that more than compensated them. It appears that 
states found this readily acceptable. If, in the future, in the UK parts of social security 
were devolved, providing devolved money came with devolved responsibility then 
who would resist? In the USA, fully-funded autonomy was irresistible. 
 
The Politics of Comparative Politics: Howard Glennerster 
For me this very interesting paper raises a whole series of questions about the politics 
of comparative policy. How did it come about that the UK took so much notice in the 
mid 1990s of changes that were happening to a very different kind of welfare system? 
Why America when there were models so much nearer in geography and values – 
namely Europe and Australia? Were the changes not, in fact, more derivative of 
Scandinavian, Dutch or Australian models? If so why was the rhetoric largely 
American? There is a political science answer to this question – Blair and Brown 
wanted to borrow the Clinton strategy of distinguishing New from Old Labour and use 
welfare reform to do so. The phrase ‘welfare reform’ had never entered the British 
political lexicon before this. But were there any good policy reasons to do so?  
  
Bad Reasons to Copy the US 
¾ In fact the US welfare system is so different to the UK system of income support 
that it was an odd place to look for help and still is.  
• The American term ‘welfare’ is largely confined to a programme that 
supports lone parents, essentially lone mothers. There is no parallel to 
the national means tested safety net for all residents that National 
Assistance and its successors embody.  
• The major worry in the UK and Europe has been to get young people, 
especially young men, into the labour force. The next priority has been 
the long term unemployed and older men. Then came the long term sick. 
Only after that are single parents really the ‘problem’. None of these 
previous groups were part of US welfare reform.  
• The history of welfare in the US has always involved colour. In the 
1930s when Roosevelt envisaged a Federal Programme for lone parents 
the Southern Democrats opposed it and made sure its administration 
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remained with the states. This stigma is less easy to make stick in the 
UK where broken marriages are seen to afflict all classes and races.   
• In this country, children’s welfare dominated the discussion of how to 
deal with lone parents’ problems right from the 1940s. Conservatives 
believed that it was women’s job to stay at home to look after children 
whatever their marital state. On the left trade unions did not want 
women to challenge men’s jobs.   
• In Europe there has been much puzzlement about the Anglo-Saxon 
worry about single parents. Countries that have good levels of low 
priced child care get a high level of work participation from lone parents 
as they do from married couples.  
 
Some Good Lessons? 
But there are good reasons to look around for other models than the old rather relaxed 
view of simply accommodating trends that led to long periods out of work.   
¾ Fewer lone parents are in the formal labour market than in the US or other 
European countries. The figure is 56% in the UK, 74% in the US and 70 % over 
the OECD as a whole.   
¾ Fewer are in work compared to other family types while this is not as significantly 
so elsewhere.  
¾ We permit lone parents to remain outside the labour market for longer than most 
other countries.  
But if I were looking for exemplars they would not be the harsher states in the United 
States.  
 
Where I thought Midgley was helpful was in challenging the notion that there is some 
uniform US model.   
 
The second useful topic on which he touched, and where I would have liked more, 
was on the use of private and voluntary organisations. The present government has 
backed the use of more private agencies and the Conservative Party (2008) has said 
the job of delivering their back to work policy will be largely contracted out to private 
agencies who will be rewarded for their results (p12). So here a hard look at how this 
actually works in the US would be helpful. Though again it is as well to recognise that 
the UK does not have the large scale not for profit or profit agencies the US does 
working in this field – yet.  
 
Thirdly there is the topic that David Piachaud raised. Midgley describes the very local 
administration of back to work schemes and the link with other agencies and local 
labour markets. This links up with John Hill’s (2007) work on the poor return to work 
rates we find on social housing estates. Tailoring local back to work efforts more 
closely to local situations and labour markets is important and new organizations or 
locally based ones may do the job better.  
 
 48
Trans-Atlantic Ideas  
There is something deeper that is worth exploring about the ‘Anglo-Saxon affinity’ 
issue. There is a thread to the New Conservatism here that is derivative of the modern 
right in the US. This came home to me listening to David Willetts’ first Michael 
Oakshott Memorial Lecture given here recently at the LSE. Conservatism, he argued, 
is not about weak or limited government. The state has three legitimate roles that need 
strengthening.  
¾ Law and order and defence, now including internal security from terrorist attack.  
¾ Setting the framework for a competitive environment more aggressively.  
¾ Third is setting rules that promote good behaviour. This involves encouraging the 
small battalions – voluntary organisations, informal self help and the family. Since 
marriage, work and the traditional family are some of the ultimate expressions of 
good behaviour government must give powerful incentives to sustain them.  
This is where welfare reform policy links onto a much larger agenda and the 
American debate does become relevant whether we agree or not.  
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